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DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE:
A DANGEROUS EXPERIMENT IN CHILD WELFARE
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET*
ABSTRACT
Differential Response represents the most important child welfare initiative of the day,
with Differential Response programs rapidly expanding throughout the country. It is designed to radically change our child welfare system, diverting the great majority of Child
Protective Services cases to an entirely voluntary system. This Article describes the serious
risks Differential Response poses for children and the flawed research being used to promote
it as “evidence based.” It puts the Differential Response movement in historical context as
one of a series of extreme family preservation movements supported by a corrupt merger of
advocacy with research. It argues for reform that would honor children’s rights, confront the
problems of poverty underlying child maltreatment in a serious way, and expand rather
than reduce the capacity of Child Protective Services to address child maltreatment. It calls
for a change in the dynamics of child welfare research and policy so that we can avoid endlessly repeating history in ways harmful to child interests.
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INTRODUCTION
A powerful coalition of forces is pushing our nation’s child welfare
system toward a “reform” they generally call Differential Response
(DR). The idea is to divert the vast majority of cases now dealt with
by child protective services (CPS) to an entirely voluntary system
that leaves parents free to refuse to participate without fear of any
consequence.
Other names for DR systems include Alternative Response (AR),
Family Assessment Response, Dual-Track, Multi-Track, or MultipleResponse Systems, and in an earlier era, Community Partnership.1
DR is often used to refer to the overall system that includes two
1. I discuss Community Partnerships in my 1999 book, Nobody’s Children.
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN 146-54 (1999). DR was first implemented in
Missouri and Florida between 1993 and 1995. Alan Puckett, Casey Family Programs,
Differential Response: Review and Summary of Research Evidence, UNIV. OF COLO. DENVER
(Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/medicalschool/departments/
pediatrics/subs/can/DR/Documents/Conference%202013%20Handouts/Friday/DR%20Review
%20and%20Summary%20of%20Research%20Evidence.pdf (last visited July 20, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/7D8W-F2GJ.
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tracks—one, the new AR Track, and the other, the traditional CPS
track.2 Some systems have a third track for cases which would normally be screened out by CPS based on a conclusion that there is no
apparent need for CPS intervention to protect children.3 I will use DR
to refer to the overall system and will use AR and Traditional Response (TR) to refer to the two tracks used for cases that normally
would be screened in by CPS.
DR constitutes the latest fad in extreme forms of family preservation promoted over recent decades.4 It is expanding rapidly throughout the country.5 One comprehensive analysis of DR notes that the
“development of a national advocacy team and access to significant
federal and foundation resources” make DR “one of the more widely
replicated child welfare reform efforts in recent history.”6 An important 2014 Report summarizing recent research indicates that DR
has already been implemented in a majority of states.7 The federal
2. For DR history, descriptions, and definitions, see generally INST. OF MED. & NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEW DIRECTIONS IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT RESEARCH 198-99,
203-04 (Anne C. Peterson et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter IOM/NRC 2014 REPORT], available
at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2013/New-Directions-in-Child-Abuse-and-Neglect-Research.
aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/8DSZ-FR79; TAMARA FULLER ET AL., DIFFERENTIAL
RESPONSE IN ILLINOIS: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT 6-10 (2013) [hereinafter FULLER ET AL.,
FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT], available at http://cfrc.illinois.edu/pubs/rp_20140205_
DifferentialResponseInIllinoisFinalEvaluationReport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PA8KQHRJ; LISA MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., NATIONAL QUALITY IMPROVEMENT CENTER ON
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES, FINAL REPORT: QIC-DR CROSSSITE EVALUATION 5-23 (2014), available at http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/
colleges/medicalschool/departments/pediatrics/subs/can/QIC-DR/Documents/Final%20Cross
%20Site%20Evaluation%20Report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H8U5-7FNW; Tamara
L. Fuller et al., Differential Response Family Assessments: Listening to What Parents Say
About Service Helpfulness, 39 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 7, 7-8 (2015).
3. See STEVE OLSON & CLARE STROUD, INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
CHILD MALTREATMENT RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE FOR THE NEXT DECADE 84 (2012),
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13368, archived at http://perma.cc/
FXC8-EQPR.
4. See generally BARTHOLET, supra note 1, for a critique of the child welfare system’s
excessive bias for family preservation at the expense of children’s interests.
5. See KRISTIN ABNER & RACHEL A. GORDON, DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE: A FAMILY
IMPACT ANALYSIS 6 (2012), http://www.familyimpactseminars.org/fia_analyses_drfia.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/8W6B-MSQB. A major push was provided by the Harvard
Executive Sessions of New Paradigms for Child Protection between 1994 and 1997, funded
by the Annie E. Casey and Edna McConnell Clark Foundations. Id. at 5. Missouri subsequently established a DR system which became a model for other states, and by late 2010,
twenty-one states had implemented DR in at least some part of their systems. JOANNE
RUPPEL ET AL., DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN NEW YORK
STATE: IMPLEMENTATION, INITIAL OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS OF PILOT PROJECT 5-6 (2011),
available at http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/reports/CPS%20Differential%20Response
%20Evaluation%20Final%20Report_%20Jan%202011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
33XM-8HL3.
6. Ronald C. Hughes et al., Issues in Differential Response, 23 RES. ON SOC. WORK
PRAC. 493, 494 (2013).
7. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 17-18 fig. 2.1; see also IOM/NRC 2014
REPORT, supra note 2, at 199; KAI GUTERMAN ET AL., CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, THE
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government gave DR a boost in 2010 by reauthorizing the Child
Abuse and Prevention Treatment Act (CAPTA)8 with language requiring states to include “differential response in triage procedures
for the appropriate referral of a child not at risk of imminent harm to
a community organization or voluntary preventive service.”9
The wealthy and powerful Casey Family Programs has combined
with the American Humane Association, the Institute of Applied Research (IAR), and the Kempe Center for the Prevention and Treatment of Child Abuse and Neglect, to promote DR, provide technical
assistance in implementing DR, and design and implement the research used to claim that DR is an evidence-based success story.10
Casey Family Programs has played a central role. Its policy team
maintains a major presence on Capitol Hill, in state governments,
and in major child welfare policy forums around the country.11 Casey’s financial and human resources provide a unique ability to influence policy.12 It has supported DR in a major way since 2003 when it

DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE (DR) IMPLEMENTATION RESOURCE KIT: A RESOURCE FOR
JURISDICTIONS CONSIDERING OR PLANNING FOR DR 6 (2014) (stating that DR exists in
relatively pure form in twenty-two states, with similar system reforms operational in eight
additional states, and another twelve states currently considering or planning DR implementation); OLSON & STROUD, supra note 3, at 84; Daniel Heimpel, Differential Response
Dealt Heavy Blow, THE CHRONICLE OF SOC. CHANGE (June 24, 2014),
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/analysis/differential-response-dealt-heavy-blow-2/7289,
archived at http://perma.cc/DR7Z-2J77 (noting that DR has spread to as many as thirty
states). By 2009, the percentage of screened-in child maltreatment reports referred to DR
reached roughly 9%. ABNER & GORDON, supra note 5, at 16 fig. 1.
8. CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-320, 124 Stat. 3459 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(v) (2012)).
9. John D. Fluke et al., Thinking Differentially: A Response to Issues in Differential
Response, 23 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 545, 546 (2013).
10. See, e.g., MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 5; see also infra Parts IV,
IV.B.1 IV.B.4, V.C. The Casey Family Programs DR Implementation Kit referred to supra
note 7 is designed to persuade and enable new jurisdictions to adopt DR, providing them a
positive slant on the evidence regarding DR along with information as to how other jurisdictions have implemented DR. This Kit documents some of the special funding and technical assistance provided to DR programs by Casey Family Programs, Casey cousin the
Marguerite Casey Foundation, IAR, and organizations involved in the QIC-DR, as discussed infra Part IV.B.1, 4 below, including the Kempe Center. See, e.g., GUTERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 57, 59, 62.
11. Memorandum from Sean Hughes on Differential Response, Racial Disproportionality, and Fed. Fin. Reform: Casey Family Programs and the Movement to End Foster Care
in America, to author and Daniel Heimpel, Founder and Director, Fostering Media Connections 3 (Aug. 28, 2013) (on file with the author). This research memorandum was written
for Elizabeth Bartholet and Daniel Heimpel based on research in spring and summer 2013.
Together with Daniel Heimpel of Fostering Media Connections and with the aid of several
research and investigation fellows, I have been investigating since June 2013 DR policy
and research as well as related issues involving the current state of the Racial Disproportionality movement.
12. Id.
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sponsored a Breakthrough Series Collaborative on DR13 and “formed
a partnership with [California counties] . . . to develop, test, and
begin implementing differential response . . . .”14
One observer sums up:
Perhaps the most important common thread has been the extent to
which Casey Family Programs has been the primary proponent
and funder of [the DR and related finance reform movement along
with other family preservation efforts]. . . . Notably, [these] movements possess at their core a commitment to reducing out-of-home
care placements. This supports Casey’s 2020 goal of reducing foster care caseloads by half, and helps explain why Casey has invested so heavily . . . .15

This kind of family preservation movement has enormous power
to shape the child welfare system. It is designed to change the way
CPS systems use their broad discretionary power to decide whether
or not to intervene in families to protect children against parental
abuse and neglect. It may or may not be translated into formal law
requiring CPS systems to implement DR. But regardless, it operates
effectively as law, changing the nature of our child protection systems. As such, it constitutes an end run around legislation like the
federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), which was
designed to reduce family preservation bias and make child safety
and well-being a higher priority.16 So, for example, ASFA tells state
CPS systems and courts that children must be removed from parents
found responsible for certain forms of dangerous child maltreatment,
but those ASFA requirements are inapplicable if CPS never intervenes to make such findings.
The DR movement promotes two inter-related ideas. First is to
divert the vast majority of cases now on the CPS track to a purely
voluntary, “family-friendly” track.17 “Family” means parents, because
the basic idea is to be friendly to parents accused of maltreating chil13. CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, IMPLEMENTING DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IN
CALIFORNIA: PROMISING PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED vi (2007), available at
http://www.cfpic.org/pdfs/BSCDifferentialResponseCA.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
7SNT-H777.
14. Id.; see also Heimpel, supra note 7 (“Casey Family Programs . . . has poured money into DR expansion from California to Illinois.”).
15. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 65; see also Daniel Heimpel,
‘Alternative Response’ Is No Solution to Child Abuse [Commentary], BALT. SUN (July 17,
2014),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-07-17/news/bs-ed-alternative-response-2014
0717_1_child-abuse-neglect-child-welfare, archived at http://perma.cc/HF7E-L3X7 (noting
Casey Family Programs’ lobbying strength and its substantial investments in reducing
foster care placements). See generally Part IV for Casey Family Programs’ role in DR.
16. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2000)); see also BARTHOLET, supra note
1, at 188-89 (discussing the ASFA).
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.

578

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:573

dren. Under DR parents are to be free from intervention by CPS,
intervention which can take the form of monitoring to ensure child
safety at home, requirements to cooperate in rehabilitative treatment, removal of children to foster care as needed for their protection, and in the most extreme cases, termination of parental rights
and placement of children in adoption. DR advocates say that their
friendly approach will serve children better than the CPS system
because it will more likely engage parents, and they point out that
the CPS system fails to provide most of the families on its caseload
with any helpful services. They also argue that when CPS uses its
power to remove children to foster care, it often does more harm
than good.18
The second idea is to finance the DR system with funds diverted
from the traditional CPS system.19 Those promoting DR are pushing
for what they call child welfare finance reform. The major focus is on
changing the federal finance structure so as to shift federal funds
now going to support foster care to the new DR system. In addition,
DR advocates encourage the redirection of state and local funds allocated for CPS general operations to the DR system.20 This finance
reform idea, again, cuts against the principles animating ASFA.
ASFA’s goal of getting CPS and courts to put a higher priority on
child interests and child protection calls for an increase, not a decrease, in CPS resources.
The history21 here is important in understanding the nature of
this new movement and the risks it presents to children. DR is a successor to two earlier “reform” movements similarly designed to keep
more children at risk of maltreatment at home with their parents:
Intensive Family Preservation Services (IFPS)22 and Racial Disproportionality.23 All three movements have engaged in a similar strategy, impressive in its sophistication. The advocacy groups involved in
each movement have promoted the policy reform initiative; promoted
the self-serving but fundamentally flawed research designed to give
the impression that the new policy was successful; launched campaigns to persuade a broad range of players from policymakers, to
academics, to media of its wisdom; and promoted implementation by

18. See discussion infra Part II.A.
19. See discussion infra Part II.B.
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. See discussion infra Part I.
22. See generally BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 114-21 (describing IFPS programs and
research).
23. See Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 873-74 (2009).
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child welfare administrations throughout the nation and by state and
federal legislatures.24
In the past, these reform initiatives have largely collapsed as the
research has been found flawed and fraudulent and as the risks to
children have become obvious. But memories in the child welfare
field seem short.
History is repeating itself with the DR movement. DR advocates
make the familiar claim that DR is “evidence based,” that it will save
money by reducing foster care and thus costs to the state, but magically that it will not put children at any risk.25 However, the flaws in
the DR research are blatantly obvious, as is discussed in Part IV below. The risks DR poses for children are similarly obvious. Research
shows that children on the traditional CPS track are at enormous
risk of repeat maltreatment by their parents. If kept at home, most
will continue to be abused and neglected. If removed to foster care
and then returned home, most will be again abused and neglected.
The large majority of the CPS caseload that DR is designed to move
to the voluntary track are not minor “dirty house” or “mere poverty”
cases, as advocates often contend. CPS legislation is designed to protect poor parents from state intervention based on circumstances
beyond the parents’ control. The cases in which CPS intervenes generally involve serious drug and/or alcohol abuse, forms of “neglect”
that are known to destroy kids’ chances for normal development, and
situations where serious violence exists but is simply not obvious.26
We do need to protect children better. Families on the CPS caseload are not receiving the supportive and rehabilitative services they
need. Children are not receiving the protection they need.
But there is no reason to believe that simply removing the power
of CPS to monitor these families, to require cooperation with rehabilitative treatment, and to remove children from parents will work
better to protect children. Research reveals that while it is hard for
parents to free themselves from drug and alcohol addiction, coercive
pressure to engage in treatment does sometimes work.27 Polite requests to engage in treatment on a purely voluntary basis are not
likely to work better or, indeed, as well.28

24. See supra notes 22-23; infra Parts I.A, I.B, II, IV, V.C.
25. See Parts IV.B.1.d,IV.B.1.e, IV.B.4.b.
26. For documentation of the claims in this paragraph, see BARTHOLET, supra note 1,
at 82-85, 233-35; Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System:
Effective Early Intervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60
BUFF. L. REV. 1323, 1323-24 (2012); discussion infra Part III.A, III.B.1.a, III.B.1.b.i.
27. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.b.i.
28. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.b.i.
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We need to strengthen the CPS system, provide it with more resources to monitor parents, and provide more parents with more rehabilitative services. We need to do a version of differential treatment but within, and not outside of, the context of the CPS system;
so rehabilitative treatment can be required, not just suggested, and
so children can be protected in cases in which parents are unable or
unwilling to take the necessary steps to become capable of nurturing.
CPS should, of course, be targeting different kinds of family situations with different types of treatment—to a great degree, CPS does
that now. For many families, that means keeping the children at
home with supportive and rehabilitative services. But CPS will need
more resources to do its job better. It keeps many children at home
now with few, if any, services provided,29 in significant part because
it is forced to triage and devote most of its limited resources to the
most serious cases.
We also need to strengthen CPS by improving its ability to protect
children through removal and through termination of parental rights
and adoption, as needed. Nobody wants children to go through unnecessarily the disruption of removal to foster care or termination of parental rights and adoption. But research reveals that foster care operates to protect children against the risk of death and other serious
harm at home.30 It would work better for children if more often it was
followed by timely termination of parental rights and adoption.31 Adoption works well for children, generally, but it works best when they
have not suffered lengthy periods of maltreatment or foster drift.32
DR proponents claim that by removing significant numbers of
children from the CPS system, they will free that system to do a better job for the most serious abuse and neglect cases.33 But DR is designed not simply to remove children from the CPS system, but also
to weaken that system. The goal is not simply to divert children, but
also to divert resources from the already resource-starved system to

29. See PATRICIA L. KOHL, UNSUCCESSFUL IN-HOME CHILD WELFARE SERVICE PLANS
FOLLOWING A MALTREATMENT INVESTIGATION: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES 5 (2007),
available
at
http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/UnsuccessfulIn-Home.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/5FLG-A5AM (stating that in the overwhelming majority of cases that come
to the attention of CPS, the child is kept at home with a biological parent or another caregiver and with many families—even those with substantiated maltreatment—not receiving
services).
30. See discussion infra Part III.A.
31. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 97, 110.
32. Id. at 179; Bartholet, supra note 23, at 896-97.
33. Daniel Heimpel & Elizabeth Bartholet, DCF Shift Puts Children’s Safety at Risk,
THE HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 24, 2014, available at http://articles.courant.com/2014-0124/news/hc-op-dheimpel-connecticut-dcf-children-safety-at--20140124_1_dcf-responsechildren, archived at http://perma.cc/LNJ3-UR3G.
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fund the new voluntary track system. It would leave CPS less, not
more, able to appropriately handle the most serious cases.
There are reasons why many child welfare leaders keep promoting
extreme family preservation movements. Child maltreatment is rooted in poverty and in the conditions associated with poverty, including
unemployment, substance abuse, and devastated neighborhoods.34
Those committing child maltreatment are themselves victims. Many
who have promoted extreme forms of family preservation over the
years see CPS intervention—including, in particular, removal to foster care and adoption—as yet another form of victimization.35 And
they see the kinds of financial support family preservation programs
like DR provide as at least some help in alleviating some of the financial needs of poor parents.
But DR cannot be justified as a poverty program. It provides pathetically limited financial stipends to a small and irrationally selected subset of the poor—those who abuse and neglect their children. This will do nothing significant to change poverty conditions in
our society.
Worse, DR sacrifices a subset of poor children—those abused and
neglected—condemning them to a childhood of suffering that will also
limit their life opportunities as adults. If our society honored children
as having moral worth equivalent to adults and honored child human
rights as being equivalent to adult human rights, we would not tolerate the extreme family preservation policies that regularly reappear.
Children would be seen as having a fundamental human right to
grow up with nurturing parents, a right of equal importance to the
adult right to raise children free from state intervention.
We do need to address the conditions of poverty that create child
maltreatment, but we need to address them in a serious way,
through radical social change. In the meantime, we need to develop
targeted maltreatment prevention programs designed to reach parents before they fall into the dysfunction associated with child maltreatment. And for those children victimized by serious maltreatment, we need a CPS system that is strengthened enough to provide
real protection through adequate supportive services, required rehabilitation programs, quality foster care, and adoption for those children whose parents cannot provide nurturing parenting.

34. See Bartholet, supra note 23, at 874-76.
35. Id. at 887.
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I. PRIOR HISTORY: EXTREME FAMILY PRESERVATION
MOVEMENTS SUPPORTED BY ADVOCACY RESEARCH
I have written previously of the corrupt merger of policy advocacy
with research in the movements supporting both IFPS and Racial
Disproportionality.36 Here I will briefly summarize the highlights.
There are other family preservation movements with similar characteristics; but the IFPS and Racial Disproportionality movements best
illustrate the troubling dynamics that have characterized child welfare advocacy and related research over the last few decades and that
are at issue in the DR movement today.
A. Intensive Family Preservation Services
IFPS was avidly promoted from the 1970s through the 1990s by
the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation and the Annie E. Casey
Foundation.37 It swept the nation and was adopted by many states’
child welfare systems. The basic idea was to define children who are
identified as abused and neglected as being “at risk of removal” to
foster care, with the goal of keeping as many as possible at home.
The means was to provide social worker support services on an intensive basis for roughly six weeks based on the absurd notion that child
maltreatment was typically a short-term crisis.
The research evaluating IFPS focused not on how well or badly
the program served child interests, but instead on whether IFPS succeeded in its goal of keeping children at home, thus saving the state
money through the reduction of foster care costs. It took years for
child welfare experts to focus on the flaw at the heart of the research,
namely that it paid no attention to child interests. Eventually those
analyzing the research also noted that IFPS failed even to succeed in
its family preservation goal. In the end, the program was seriously
discredited and largely abandoned.38
One article provides a telling critique of the earlier IFPS research,
noting methodological problems, failure to reduce removal, and failure to focus on child well-being. It concludes with a call for more appropriate research in the future:

36. See Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1334-35, 1340-42; Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a
Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: The Use and Misuse of Research, 13 WHITTIER J.
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 8-15 (2014) [hereinafter Bartholet, The Use and Misuse of Research];
see generally Bartholet, supra note 23 (focusing solely on Racial Disproportionality).
37. See Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1332; see also BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 141,
154; RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: HOW PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST
CHILDREN’S LIVES 122-35, 139-40 (1996).
38. GELLES, supra note 37, at 139-40; IRA M. SCHWARTZ & GIDEON FISHMAN, KIDS
RAISED BY THE GOVERNMENT 44-46 (Simon Hakim ed., 1999).
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[M]ore attention should be directed toward determining whether
the child’s overall functioning has improved because of the services
received. Has abuse or neglect reoccurred? Have the child’s growth
and development been optimized? Has the child’s cognitive and social development shown changes for the better? These and other
outcomes will need to be addressed to obtain a clearer understanding of the benefits and limitations of family preservation. . . . Alternatives to family preservation, such as permanency planning
(adoption) and foster care, also must be reexamined . . . . Applying
family preservation to every family, as a matter of policy, may actually be placing children at risk.39

Richard Gelles documents in Book of David the degree to which
this private foundation advocacy was responsible for the IFPS
movement and for its success for many years in changing the nation’s
child welfare system:
[T]he expansion of the concept of family preservation and the
growing support for the programs[] . . . could not have been
achieved without the support, financial and otherwise, of two large
and influential foundations. The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation . . . and the Annie E. Casey Foundation[] . . . played crucial
roles in the selling, or overselling, of family preservation.
Both foundations marketed family preservation with a nearreligious zeal and substantial financial support. They funded startup and demonstration programs and then promoted them.
[They] became the official repositories of expertise and data on
family preservation. State, local, and federal agencies and officials . . . relied on the two foundations for their evaluation data.
....
When the believers are foundations who can invest millions of
dollars each year in touting the programs and when the critics
are academics who merely publish their research results in
scholarly journals, the outcome is entirely predictable. State and
local agency heads, legislators and legislative aides, governors
and presidential administrations were told about the unqualified
successes of family preservation and the tremendous cost savings. The skeptics and critics were either unknown or cast as
merely academic gadflies.40

39. Amy M. Heneghan et al., Evaluating Intensive Family Preservation Programs: A
Methodological Review, 97 PEDIATRICS 535, 541 (1996); see also Viola VaughanEden & Frank E. Vandervort, Invited Commentary on “Issues in Differential Response,” 23
RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 550, 551-52 (2013) (discussing the relevance of the IFPS history
to the DR movement).
40. GELLES, supra note 37, at 133-35.
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B. Racial Disproportionality
Racial Disproportionality was avidly promoted by various Casey
Foundations,41 together with a broad consortium of establishment
child welfare organizations, in the early part of this century.42 What
came to be known as the Casey Alliance led the movement, working to
get every state to adopt policies designed to reduce the number of
black children removed to foster care with the goal of achieving a
match between their percentage of the foster care population and their
percentage of the general population. The Alliance also began work to
get the federal government to condition its funding of state child welfare systems on their ability to achieve this “racial equity” goal.
The basic idea was that the removal of black children in numbers
disproportionate to their population percentage was caused by current racial bias in the child welfare system. This racial bias claim
relied almost entirely on research known as the National Incidence
Study (NIS), which stated in its 1996 NIS-3 Report that actual rates
of maltreatment by black and white parents were the same, and accordingly, that bias must explain the different rates of removal to
foster care.
The Casey Alliance used its wealth both to promote policy advocacy on these issues and to fund related research. For example, it approached states throughout the country saying: we will help study
your racial disproportionality problem, write the report stating the
nature of your problem, and then help solve your problem with appropriate new policies. These state reports’ claims regarding bias
almost all come back to the NIS research.
The Casey Alliance successfully sold the idea that racial bias in
the CPS system was responsible for the number of black children in
foster care to policymakers, academics, and the media. But the claim
on which the racial bias theory was primarily based, that black maltreatment rates were the same as white maltreatment rates, was false.
The NIS-3 Report’s own data, hidden in a later-published appendix,
showed that actual black maltreatment rates were higher than white
maltreatment rates, and that the difference in rates approximated the
difference in official maltreatment reports and related removal rates.
There was a lot of other evidence available to the Casey Alliance
demonstrating that the NIS-3 claims regarding comparative rates
and system bias were likely wrong. A major conference on Racial Dis41. The Casey organizations were the Anne E. Casey Foundation, Casey Family Services, Casey Family Programs, The Jim Casey Youth Opportunities Initiative, and the
Marguerite Casey Foundation. Bartholet, supra note 23, at 880.
42. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1340-42; Bartholet, The Use and Misuse of
Research, supra note 36, at 9-15. For more specifics on the Racial Disproportionality
movement summarized here, see generally Bartholet, supra note 23.

2015]

DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE

585

proportionality at Harvard Law School (HLS) in 2011 presented research by many eminent social scientists demonstrating that there
was no basis for the NIS-3 claims in the authors’ own data, and that
the claims were inconsistent with persuasive, independent research.
By the time of this HLS conference, the NIS-4 Report had been
released, and the authors had conceded that then, with a larger sample, they found a statistically significant difference between actual
black and white maltreatment rates, without conceding any error in
their previous claims regarding comparative rates and racial bias.
The conference organizers co-authored a paper, published as an
Issue Brief by the conference co-sponsor, Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago, a highly respected research institute. The paper stated that the evidence presented at the conference helped demonstrate
that higher rates of black family contact with the child welfare system reflected higher rates of actual maltreatment. It concluded:
We believe that the evidence presented at this conference signals
that it is time for reconsideration of certain past assumptions and
conclusions. It indicates that generally there is a significant
black/white maltreatment gap, one that roughly parallels the gap
in official maltreatment reports. This evidence contradicts the belief that black children are included at high rates in the child welfare system because of racial bias.43

I concluded in a related article:
At a minimum, the [Racial Disproportionality] claim regarding
discrimination was irresponsible, and grounded on bad social science that flew in the face of a large body of contrary evidence. It
helped make the case for keeping more black children with parents accused of maltreatment, despite the fact that if black children were subject to disproportionately high rates of maltreatment, they should for their own protection be removed at similarly high rates.44

The Racial Disproportionality movement has been significantly
disrupted. A chapter in the recent publication, Handbook of Child
Maltreatment, concludes that the HLS conference and my related
work have resulted in a change in the dialogue on this issue, such
that racial disproportionality can no longer be equated with racial
bias, and proportionate representation can no longer considered be
an appropriate goal.45 However the movement has not been entirely
43. See Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Race and Child Welfare, CHAPIN HALL 4 (June
2011), http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/publications/06_27_11_Issue%20Brief_
F.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7GAL-LSJN.
44. Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1343.
45. Alan J. Dettlaff, The Evolving Understanding of Disproportionality and Disparities in Child Welfare, 2 CHILD MALTREATMENT HANDBOOK149-68 (Jill E. Korbin & Richard
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derailed. Movement proponents continue to promote its claims and
goals. And many of those supporting the movement have simply
shifted energy and resources toward supporting DR.46
In DR we see the historical pattern playing out once more. We
again have powerful private organizations mounting a sophisticated
campaign to promote an extreme family preservation policy. We
again have self-serving research deployed as a central part of the
strategy, research that ignores important child interests in safety
and well-being. We again have policymakers blindly accepting the
research claims and embracing this new silver-bullet fix that promises to improve the child welfare system while saving states money.
We also are beginning to see the emergence of a serious challenge
to the DR movement. Some of this is based on a debate that has
erupted in the social science community, with the validity of the advocacy research that the DR movement has propagated now being
questioned by independent social scientists.47
II. NATURE OF THE DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE MOVEMENT
A. Program Characteristics
While DR programs vary in details, most share certain core essentials, and DR proponents advocate for these essentials.48
1. The Diversion Goal
DR is designed to divert a large percentage of the cases that are
traditionally under CPS jurisdiction to the new, voluntary AR track.
Advocates often talk of diverting something in the range of 70% of
CPS cases.49 Current programs vary significantly in the percentage

D.
Kingman
eds.,
2014),
available
at
http://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-7208-3_8.
46. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 16-22. Many argue that DR
will help to reduce disproportionality and many keep track of race statistics as part of their
DR analyses. Id.
47. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
48. See, e.g., RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 9 (listing in a chart core essentials and
differences between Family Assessment Response and Traditional Investigative Response);
see also MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 5-13 (contrasting AR and TR).
49. Elizabeth Bartholet & Daniel Heimpel, Through the Cracks, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
24, 2013, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/12/24/saving-childrenfrom-our-child-welfare-system/euxaDvobzhfhY7zpm1CYmO/story.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/AXK9-WTRW; Daniel Heimpel, Are Child Protection Quotas Endangering
Minnesota Children?, THE CHRONICLE OF SOCIAL CHANGE, Sep. 22, 2014, available at
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/news/are-child-protection-quotas-endangering-minnesotachildren/8162, archived at https://perma.cc/5YPW-QWN6 (quoting Eric Fenner, the managing director at Casey Family Programs, who stated that they had “goals of 70 percent”); see
also Daniel Heimpel, Does Race Influence Child Protection Efforts in Minnesota?,
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diverted, from 8% to over 70%, with the percentage in any given program generally increasing over time.50
The cases to be diverted are characterized as low-risk, or low- to
medium- risk, though as discussed below there are serious questions as to whether these characterizations actually fit the cases
being diverted.51
Diversion at the front end reduces the likelihood that children will
ever be removed from their parents. If children are not under CPS
jurisdiction in the first place, then CPS is less likely to accumulate
the evidence supporting a removal to foster care or termination of
parental rights and adoption. This fits with the longstanding Casey
Family Programs goal of reducing foster care by 50% by 2020.52 Casey makes clear that it links DR with this reduction goal.53 That goal
also fueled the Racial Disproportionality movement, with Casey
thinking it could achieve half of its foster care reduction goal just by
eliminating disproportionality.54
2. Voluntary, Not Coercive
The AR track is entirely voluntary for parents. At the outset, they
can accept or reject the offer to participate in the AR program, with
no consequence for rejecting it. They can also start down the AR
track but can get off of it at any point they choose, again with no con-

STARTRIBUNE, Oct. 17, 2014, available at http://www.startribune.com/does-race-influencechild-protection-efforts-in-minnesota/279629742/, archived at http://perma.cc/W9Y8-J45N.
50. See Theodore P. Cross et al., What Will Happen to this Child if I Report? Outcomes of Reporting Child Maltreatment, Presentation at the APSAC Conference 20 (June
2014) (on file with author); see also Alicia Kyte et al., Evaluating Where We’re at with Differential Response, 37 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 125, 129 (2013) (stating that approximately 60% to 80% of cases are diverted to a DR track in many states); C. Nicole Lawrence et
al., Multiple Response System: Evaluation of Policy Change in North Carolina’s Child
Welfare System, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 2355, 2364 (2011) (stating that 70% to
80% of cases in the North Carolina system were diverted to DR programs and 42% to 71%
of cases were diverted to DR programs in other states).
51. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.a.iii (discussing the evidence as to the actual risk
level of the cases being diverted).
52. CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, MOVING TOWARD HOPE: PATHS TO KEEP CHILDREN
SAFE, MAKE FAMILIES STRONG AND BUILD SUPPORTIVE COMMUNITIES 5 (2013) (“When we
launched our 2020 Strategy for America's Children in 2006, some questioned our goal to
safely reduce by 50 percent the number of children in foster care in the U.S. by the year
2020.” (statement of Shelia Evans-Tranumn, Chair, Board of Trustees)); CASEY FAMILY
PROGRAMS, 2008 CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2008) [hereinafter 2008
CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS ANNUAL REPORT] (on file with author).
53. 2008 CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 23 (“Casey Family Programs has championed differential response for several years as an effective practice
that safely reduces the number of children entering foster care. Our paramount goal is to
safely reduce the number of children in foster care by 50 percent by the year 2020.”).
54. Id. at 33.
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sequence.55 Thus, parents who are thought to be responsible for child
maltreatment and who are assigned to the AR track can simply walk
away from any rehabilitation services or requirements and any monitoring or surveillance.
Evidence that parents continue to mistreat their children can generate a decision to move the family that is initially assigned to AR to
the traditional or TR track,56 but the system is not designed to place
much emphasis on looking for such evidence. AR track social workers
might become aware of maltreatment, in which case they would be
obliged as mandated reporters to report it to CPS. But the overall
goal of the AR system is to embrace diversion and parent-friendly
policies, and it appears that generally, little emphasis is placed on
identifying maltreatment.
Also, parents who refuse participation from the outset will not be
seeing social workers, so there will not be the kind of evidence of maltreatment that would surface when parents meet regularly with social workers as required in the traditional CPS system.
In fact, only a tiny percentage of AR families are actually
switched from the AR to the TR track based on social workers’ conclusions that children were wrongfully assigned to AR or were otherwise in danger. The state reports that reveal evidence of switch
rates show rates ranging from 2% (Virginia), 57 to 3% (Colorado),58 to
3.5% (Illinois);59 to 4% (Ohio)60; and for three New York counties,
from 0.3%, to 1.2%, to 5.6%.61 These figures are troubling given the

55. Kathryn A. Piper, Differential Response in Child Protection Services: A Comparison of Implementation and Child Safety Outcomes in Eight States 39 (June 17, 2014) (unpublished dissertation, Brandeis University) (on file with author).
56. In the Colorado system, safety concerns may trigger a referral from AR to TR.
See MARC WINOKUR ET AL., SOCIAL WORK RESEARCH CTR. AT COLO. STATE UNIV.,
PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE COLORADO CONSORTIUM ON DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE:
FINAL REPORT 25-26 (2014), available at http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/
colleges/medicalschool/departments/pediatrics/subs/can/QIC-DR/Documents/Program%
20Evaluation%20of%20the%20Colorado%20Consortium%20on%20Differential%20Respo
nse%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/37ZP-Y4BL.
57. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., EVALUATION OF THE
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE SYSTEM 12 (2008), available at https://www.dss.virginia.gov/
files/about/reports/children/cps/all_other/2008/differentialresponsesystem_evaluation_an
nualreport_2008_12-08.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/N6MN-SUH8.
58. WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 34.
59. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 30 (noting that another
9.8% were switched based on new screened-in maltreatment reports).
60. L. Anthony Loman & Gary L. Siegel, Effects of Approach and Services Under
Differential Response on Long Term Child Safety and Welfare, 39 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
86, 91 (2015), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0145
213414002099, archived at http://perma.cc/7EZQ-N7U8 (percentage calculated based on
Ohio figures given).
61. RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 38.
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evidence that a huge percentage of children in AR families are subjected to ongoing maltreatment.62
3. No Fact-Finding Investigation and No Maltreatment Findings
In a DR system, there is generally no traditional CPS fact-finding
investigation at the outset to determine whether the alleged maltreatment actually occurred and, if so, to assess the related family
dynamics in connection with deciding the track on which cases belong. Instead, a “safety assessment” determines the track, often
based simply on the limited information gathered in the initial hotline call reporting the incident to CPS, together with certain eligibility criteria.63 While some DR systems depart from the movement ideal and use an investigation to make the initial tracking decision,
most do not.64 The most influential researchers promoting DR’s success state: “A primary assumption underlying DR is that the adversarial approach of traditional investigations seeking to validate or
invalidate allegations of child maltreatment is unnecessary for all
but the most extreme and criminal reports of child abuse and neglect . . . .”65 This assumption governs both the initial approach to the
tracking decision and subsequent dealings with the family.
For the first AR home visit, an appointment is made, as compared
to the unannounced first visit in the traditional CPS system. In AR
there is no separate interview of the child at risk or other witnesses,
as compared to the traditional CPS practice of interviewing alleged
victims and other witnesses out of the presence of the alleged perpetrator. Separate interviews are what one would do to find out what
happened and whether, for example, a burn on a child is the result of
an accident or deliberate torture. But the point in AR is to be parent
friendly, and investigations focused on what parents might have
wrongfully done to a child are not thought of as friendly. Accordingly,
there is a deliberate effort to avoid focusing on the alleged maltreatment and to avoid identifying the perpetrator.66 Instead, the focus is
62. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.a.iii.
63. Hughes et al., supra note 6, at 500 (“[S]creeners in DR programs typically make
recommendations for case acceptance, establish the priority for agency response, and recommend a track assignment based on information collected in a referral telephone interview—
information that is typically limited in scope and depth and potentially in accuracy.”).
64. GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16 (showing that a majority of surveyed jurisdictions make the track assignment decision during the central intake/hotline call);
RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 45-46; see also Cross et al., supra note 50, at 4, 6.
65. Loman & Siegel, supra note 61, at 87.
66. See, e.g., Hughes et al., supra note 6, at 501 (“A defining characteristic of the
alternative DR track is that caseworkers neither substantiate allegations of child maltreatment, nor do they confirm the perpetrator. . . . [Many claim] it unnecessary (and inherently disrespectful) to push families to talk about an alleged maltreatment incident or
to determine who was responsible for its occurrence.”); id. at 501-02 (inquiring about mal-
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supposed to be on the family’s needs and how services might best
meet those needs to reduce the risk to children.
For related reasons, there is no finding of maltreatment and no
report of perpetrators to a central registry, by contrast to the traditional CPS system.67
4. Financial Support Emphasized over Rehabilitative Services
Many DR programs provide special funding for their AR tracks,
giving AR social workers additional and more flexible funds to provide financial support for parents, as compared to traditional CPS
workers.68 Accordingly, AR track programs often provide more generous financial support services than their corresponding CPS programs. Special selection and training for AR workers orients them to
be more supportive of parents and less critical, as compared to traditional CPS workers.
AR programs generally favor financial support over rehabilitative
services, as compared to corresponding CPS programs. So, for example, AR services often consist primarily of financial subsidies for rent
payments, the purchase of household appliances, and the like, while
CPS programs are more likely to emphasize rehabilitation services
designed to enable parental fitness, such as drug and alcohol rehabilitation services and anger management counseling.69
B. Related Finance “Reform”
DR advocates have invested a lot in efforts to change the federal
system for funding state child welfare systems. The federal government funds roughly half of all state child welfare budgets, so federal
financial policy is all-powerful in determining state child welfare policy.70 States simply cannot afford not to do what the federal government says they must do as a condition of receiving federal funds.
treatment dynamics, determining who was responsible, identifying child victim, not considered routine part of information gathering, and often actively discouraged).
67. BRETT BROWN ET AL., DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE: EARLY IMPLEMENTATION AND
FIDELITY, CROSS SITE REPORT OF NATIONAL QUALITY IMPROVEMENT CENTER ON
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 7 (2012), available at
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/medicalschool/departments/pediatrics/subs/can/
DR/qicdr/General%20Resources/General%20Resources/docs/cross-site-report-may-2012.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/58CC-ZE89; Loman & Siegel, supra note 61, at 87.
68. See MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 5, 10, 32, 83.
69. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1.c, IV.B.4.b.
70. See generally AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL FUNDING FOR CHILD
WELFARE SERVICES, available at http://www.americanhumane.org/assets/pdfs/children/
federal-funding-for-child.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y549-2HJB; EMILIE STOLTZFUS,
CHILD WELFARE: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND THEIR CURRENT FUNDING
(2015),
available
at
http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.
waysandmeans.house.gov/files/R43458_gb_1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5WLQ-FCCK;
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Casey Family Programs has been a major presence, lobbying in
the Administration and Congress in recent years for what it calls
federal finance reform.71 It has worked with the American Humane
Association (AHA) to get other important organizations to join this
effort, including the Child Welfare League of America, the National
Association of Public Child Welfare Administrators, the Center for
Law and Social Policy, and the Children’s Defense Fund.72 This has
become an increasingly important strategy for expanding DR nationwide and, if successful, would free up vast new resources for DR
programs while simultaneously diverting those resources away from
the traditional CPS system and, in particular, foster care.73
The first step in the program is to enable and encourage states to
shift on an experimental and short-term basis some of their federal
foster care funding to a new DR system.74 The second step will be a
push to make this shift in funds long term and mandatory.75 This
step would require change in the underlying federal child welfare
financing system.76
Significant progress has already been made on the first step. Congress passed the Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act in 2011,77 allowing states to conduct five-year demonstration projects with funds saved from reducing foster care. Many states
have been using these “Title IV-E waivers” to fund DR programs.78

Robert Longley, Federal Funding for Child Welfare: Some States Struggle to Meet Needs,
GAO
Finds,
ABOUT
NEWS,
available
at
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/
federalbenefitprograms/a/Federal-Funding-For-Child-Welfare.htm,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/BH6A-5MFK (stating that federal funding varies by state from 25-80%).
71. Casey and its allies are promoting their finance reform ideas through, for example, testimony at congressional hearings, participation in House and Senate foster care
caucuses, financing publications issued by partner organizations, and their own marketing
materials. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11 at 4-5, 26-28; see generally, e.g.,
The Antwone Fisher Story as a Case Study for Child Welfare: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Fin., 113th Cong. 8-10 (2013) (statement of Eric Fenner, Managing Director of Casey
Family Programs); Preventing Child Abuse and Improving Responses to Families in Crisis:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Healthy Families and Cmtys. of the H. Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 111th Cong. 16-18 (2009) (statement of Caren Kaplan, Director of Child Protection Reform, AHA).
72. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 26-28.
73. Id. at 4, 23-24.
74. Id. at 25-26.
75. Id. at 26.
76. Id. at 6, 38-58, 60-64 (detailing Casey’s monumental finance reform campaign of
recent years).
77. Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-34,
§ 201, 125 Stat. 369, 382 (2011). The Act requires states to certify that they are using DR
for children found not to be at risk of imminent harm. CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-320, § 115, 124 Stat. 3459, 3467-74; see MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra
note 2, at 17.
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Casey believes that these waiver programs will create momentum for
more structural changes to the federal child welfare financing system.
Meanwhile, Casey has embarked on a major push to enlist advocates and policymakers in support of the second step. This multifaceted effort has included developing and submitting a finance reform proposal to a key Congressional committee,79 and funding coalitions and forums dedicated to pursuing finance reform (including the
Partnership to Protect Children and Strengthen Families80 and, more
recently, a Brookings Institute-led series of meetings with congressional and Administration staff).81 The Casey policy team also routinely presents at child welfare gatherings around the country about
the need for finance reform.82

78. Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act, §§ 101–03; see generally Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 25. The 2011 Act permits a
waiver of the normal requirement of Title I-E of the Social Security Act that funds saved by
reducing foster care must be returned to the federal government. See CASEY FAMILY
PROGRAMS, DR RESOURCE KIT, supra note 7, at 6; see generally JAMES BELL ASSOCIATES,
INC., PROFILES OF THE TITLE IV-E CHILD WELFARE WAIVER DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS
(2013), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/waiver_profiles_vol2.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/GN9D-9TJ5 (describing, on a state by state basis, child welfare
demonstration projects).
79. See generally CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, ENSURING SAFE, NURTURING AND
PERMANENT FAMILIES FOR CHILDREN: THE NEED FOR FEDERAL FINANCE REFORM 8 (2010)
(discussing Casey’s involvement in making a push for child welfare reform), available at
http://www.casey.org/media/WhitePaper-NeedForFinanceReform.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/9TRP-TQJ5. The Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support is
now known as the Subcommittee on Human Resources. See Press Release, U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, Chairman Camp Announces Republican
Membership on Ways & Means Subcommittees for 112th Congress (Jan. 6, 2011), available
at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=219142 (stating that the Subcommittee on Human Resources was known as the Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support during the 110th and 111th Congresses).
80. See Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 45-53.
81. See id. at 53-58.
82. Recently, Casey Staff prepared and helped guide the California Child Welfare
Council through a series of proposals that would expand the array of services eligible for
federal reimbursement to include those, like DR, that “meet the needs of a child and their
family in a family-based setting.” CAL. CHILD WELFARE COUNCIL, FEDERAL CHILD
WELFARE FINANCE REFORM: THE CALIFORNIA FRAMEWORK 2, available at
//www.chhs.ca.gov/CWCDOC/3_CA%20Framework%20for%20Finance%20Reform.pdf (last
visited July 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4WFB-2772; see generally CAL. CHILD
WELFARE COUNCIL, FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE FINANCE REFORM: A CALL TO ACTION TO
SUPPORT CALIFORNIA FAMILIES (2013), available at http://www.chhs.ca.gov/CWCDOC/
4_CalltoAction_Finance%20Reform.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7R4Q-QHWU; CAL.
CHILD WELFARE COUNCIL, FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE FINANCE REFORM: A TOOLKIT FOR
CALIFORNIA (2014), available at http://www.chhs.ca.gov/CWCDOC/1_Finance%20Reform
%20Toolkit%20Overview.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DN7R-GHK6; CAL. CHILD
WELFARE COUNCIL, FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE FINANCE REFORM: FACT SHEET, available at
http://www.chhs.ca.gov/CWCDOC/2_%20Fact%20Sheet%20on%20Finance%20Reform.pdf
(last visited July 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/N9J7-TYTA; CAL. CHILD WELFARE
COUNCIL, FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE FINANCE REFORM: THE CALIFORNIA FRAMEWORK,
available at http://www.chhs.ca.gov/CWCDOC/3_CA%20Framework%20for%20Finance
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Simultaneously, states are being encouraged to shift some of their
general CPS support funds from traditional CPS activities to help
fund new DR programs—the logic being that as significant numbers
of cases are diverted from CPS to DR, expenses for such traditional
CPS activities as investigation and monitoring should go down.83
The DR movement strategy has been to use the latest stage of selfserving research— conducted as part of the QIC-DR project discussed
below84—to demonstrate to the federal Administration and Congress
that DR is an evidence-based success story warranting a major shift
of federal funds toward DR. But that latest stage of research did not
come out as positively as DR proponents had hoped. This, together
with the debate in the research community that has erupted and
other obvious problems with DR, all discussed below, should encourage those in charge of federal finance policy to consider the pros and
cons of DR before radically changing our child welfare financing system in ways that threaten children.
III. RISKS TO CHILDREN POSED BY DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE
A. Risks to Children in the Current System
Many think that CPS fails children by not providing enough in the
way of monitoring, rehabilitative services, removal to foster care, and
termination of parental rights so they can move on to nurturing,
adoptive homes. I tried to document this case, showing that the system is currently guilty of under-intervention, rather than overintervention, in my 1999 book, Nobody’s Children.85 Part of the problem has to do with unduly limited resources, and another part with
undue deference to family preservation and parental rights by both
CPS and the courts.86
DR advocates claim that their program is justified, in part, because CPS fails to provide services to so many of the cases in its jurisdiction.87 But an obvious solution to this problem would be to pro%20Reform.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4WFB-2772 (lasted visited July 26, 2014)
(documents provided at March 12, 2014 meeting of the California Child Welfare Council).
83. E-mail from Ronald Hughes, Executive Director, North American Resource Center
for Child Welfare and the Institute for Human Services (HIS/NARCCW), to author (July
11, 2014, 3:32 PM) (on file with author); e-mail from Sean Hughes, Managing Partner,
Social Change Partners, LLC, San Francisco, CA., to author (July 11, 2014) (on file with
author).
84. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.
85. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 98-110.
86. Id.
87. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 8; Cynthia Godsoe, Just Intervention:
Differential Response in Child Protection, 21 BROOK. J. OF L. AND POLICY 73, 75-76 (2012),
available at http://practicum.brooklaw.edu/sites/default/files/print/pdfs/journals/journallaw-and-policy/volume-21/issue-1/jlp_v21i_2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/63P7-GE87;
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vide CPS with more resources so that it could provide more extensive
supportive and rehabilitative services.
There are many different indications of the fact that children are
at undue risk for abuse and neglect in the current system. First, official reports indicate that one in eight children will be found by CPS
to have been maltreated.88 Also, official maltreatment reports provide
a serious underestimate of the actual maltreatment suffered. For
example, retrospective self-reports reveal that 40% of children will be
maltreated during childhood.89 Moreover, while official reports are
down recently, hospital data show children at increasing risk of suffering and dying from severe maltreatment.90
Second, experts on child maltreatment know that most children on
CPS caseloads are at serious risk of the kind of abuse and/or neglect
that jeopardizes the ability to grow up healthy and emotionally
capable of living a fulfilling life. “[T]he vast majority of families who
come to the attention of CPS are quite dysfunctional. Many are
overtly pathological and either unable or unwilling to make the
changes necessary to provide for their children’s physical and
emotional safety and/or to provide a minimal level of responsible
care . . . .”91 The great majority of CPS children—some 70% to 90%—
are living with parents addicted to drugs and/or alcohol.92 By definition, these should be considered cases in which children are at serious risk.93
Third, newspaper stories regularly chronicle deaths of children at
the hands of their parents, despite the fact that CPS workers are
supposed to be monitoring their welfare.94 These situations often inPatricia Schene, The Emergence of Differential Response, 20 PROTECTING CHILDREN 4, 4-5
(2005), available at http://www.americanhumane.org/assets/pdfs/children/differentialresponse/pc-20-2-3pdf.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/45Q8-TJ5K.
88. Christopher Wildeman et al., The Prevalence of Confirmed Maltreatment Among
US Children, 2004 to 2011, 168 JAMA PEDIATRICS 706, 706 (2014).
89. Id. at 707, 710.
90. While child welfare substantiated maltreatment rates have gone down in recent
years, the maltreatment-related severe injury rates recorded in hospital records rose some
5% from 1997 to 2009. John M. Leventhal & Julie R. Gaither, Incidence of Serious Injuries
Due to Physical Abuse in the United States: 1997 to 2009, 130 PEDIATRICS 847, 850 (2012),
available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/130/5/e847.full.pdf+html, archived at http://perma.cc/MUR2-UDLD.
91. Vaughan-Eden & Vandervort, supra note 39, at 551.
92. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 68; see also id. at 67-81, 207-32; John P. Seasock,
Identifying Abuse and Neglect in Children Whose Families are Affected by Chemical Dependence, APSAC, http://www.apsac.org/assets/documents/2014_Colloquium/2014_Handouts/
81%20workshop.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8E9H-ZT72
(stating that substance abuse exists in 40% to 80% of families where children are abused).
93. See sources cited supra note 92.
94. See, e.g., Yvonne Abraham, Jeremiah Oliver Was a Little Boy Lost, BOS. GLOBE,
Dec. 19, 2013, at B1; Michael Levenson et al., State Family Agency Fires Two in Case of
Boy Feared Dead, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2013, at A1; Michael Levenson, State Promoted
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volve cases previously categorized as neglect rather than abuse—cases
of the kind that DR advocates argue can be assumed to be minor.95
Such stories regularly describe the dangers of extreme family preservation bias96 and bemoan CPS failure to intervene more actively in the
form of both protective monitoring and removal to foster care.97
Fourth, official reports on child welfare problems, often triggered
by child deaths, regularly fault CPS for providing inadequate supervision and protection for children and fault legislators as well for the
limited funding they provide for CPS.98 These reports regularly call
for more funding for CPS so that it can reduce worker caseloads and
provide better surveillance for children kept at home, more rehabilitative services, and more aggressive intervention.99

Social Worker Before Firing Her, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 31, 2013, at A1; Jenifer McKim, Savage
Toll of Abuse for Children in DCF Care, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2014, at A1, available at
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/02/02/massachusetts-children-under-state-protection
-die-from-abuse-with-alarming-frequency/2TcwcpIbWnrANkKKQs1CVP/story.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/CSK4-5F4W; Carol Marbin Miller & Audra D.S. Burch, Preserving
Families
But
Losing
Children,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Mar.
16,
2014),
http://www.miamiherald.com/projects/2014/innocents-lost/stories/overview, archived at
http://perma.cc/6SML-83SS.
95. The Jeremiah Oliver case, Abraham, supra note 94, is one in which the great
majority of prior allegations involving the family had been for neglect, with many screened
out, and the family had a history of such issues. Nonetheless, Jeremiah was killed after
going missing for four months without CPS being aware, and the mother and her boyfriend
were charged with murder. See CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
REPORT 9-11 (2014), available at http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/press-release/140528cwla-final-report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UAS5-ND6V.
96. See, e.g., Innocents Lost: A Miami Herald I-Team Investigation, MIAMI HERALD
(Mar. 16 2014), http://media.miamiherald.com/static/media/projects/2014/innocents-lost/,
archived at http://perma.cc/GU2S-LAK8. This series helped trigger sweeping child welfare
reform legislation in Florida. See Mary Ellen Klas & Carol Marbin Miller, Florida Senate
Moves Forward with Child Welfare Law Overhaul, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014, 10:09
PM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/legislature/florida-senate-moves-forwardwith-child-welfare-law-overhaul/2173291, archived at http://perma.cc/DZX2-89KB (describing that the Innocents Lost Series’ influenced Florida to reform its child welfare legislation
through an amendment to Florida Senate Bill 1666); e-mail from Judge Jeri Cohen, of the
11th Judicial Circuit, Miami-Dade County, Florida, to author (May 4, 2014, 03:47 PM) (on
file with author).
97. Miller & Burch, supra note 94 (describing the reduction in foster care and in children under CPS supervision at home thought to be responsible for the rising number of
child deaths).
98. See, e.g., UMESH DALAL, AUDITOR’S REPORT ON THE RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES (2013), available at http://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/
richmond.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/8/bc/8bcd4476-b8bd-11e2-8442-0019bb30f31a/
518bc1cb199c3.pdf.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K5P9-GZU7; Robert Zullo, Social Services Director Retires After Scathing Report, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (May 9, 2013, 6:44
PM),
http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/local/city-of-richmond/article_fc5d04b8-b8ba11e2-a6cb-0019bb30f31a.html, archived at http://perma.cc/H5LX-ZFSN.
99. See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., supra note 95, at 50 (providing recommendations based on the investigation following Jeremiah Oliver’s death); see also Todd
Wallack, Report Urges Smaller Caseloads, Closer Scrutiny at DCF, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 13,
2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/03/13/report-dcf-needs-more-funding-care-
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Finally, social science provides persuasive evidence of the unduly
limited protection offered by CPS.100 Among cases reported to CPS
hotlines each year, roughly one-third are re-reported within twelve
months,101 and since reports are thought to be good indicators of actual past maltreatment and good predictors of future maltreatment,
this tells us that children are at undue risk. Roughly one-third of
children who died from maltreatment were known to CPS prior to
their deaths.102
Emily Putnam-Hornstein has demonstrated in impressive recent
work that for children known to CPS, “high rates of re-reporting and
maltreatment recurrence” reveal “widespread system failures to adequately and appropriately respond to child abuse and neglect.”103 Out
of children referred to CPS for maltreatment before their first birthday, 82% remained in the home, and among those, more than 60%
were referred again before the age of five.104 Out of those remaining at
home following substantiation of the initial maltreatment allegation,
58% who received no formal services were re-referred by the age of
five, and 65% of those receiving such services were re-referred by that
age.105 The net is that CPS almost always keeps children reported for
maltreatment at home and then generally fails to protect them from
repeated maltreatment, regardless of whether or not it provides services. Earlier research over several decades shows that from one-third
to one-half of children who are once identified as abused or neglected
and who are kept at home are revictimized within a few years.106
The DR research confirms the high risks to children on the traditional CPS track as well as the new AR track, showing that re-report

for-kids/RKkjP7sCqEzFWsXZQfrteK/story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DLC6-V872
(describing the 2014 interim report triggered by the Jeremiah Oliver case).
100. See generally BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 98-110 (discussing studies, hearings,
and cases that suggest more intervention is necessary).
101. Amy Conley & Jill Duerr Berrick, Community-Based Child Abuse Prevention:
Outcomes Associated with a Differential Response Program in California, 15 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 282, 282 (2010); see also KOHL, supra note 29, at 17 (noting that over onethird of children kept at home had re-report or foster placement within thirty-six months).
102. NANCY PEDDLE ET AL., CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND
FATALITIES:
THE
2000
FIFTY
STATE
SURVEY
15
(2002),
available
at
http://www.issuelab.org/resource/current_trends_in_child_abuse_prevention_reporting_and
_fatalities_the_1999_fifty_state_survey, archived at http://perma.cc/4DND-59KY.
103. Emily Putnam-Hornstein et al., Strengthening CPS Ability to Protect Infants and
Young Children Against Maltreatment 1 (Apr. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/cap/cap-conferences/pp-workshop/pp-materials/
21_strengthening-cps_putnam_hornstein.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3XCP-GLUU.
104. Emily Putnam-Horstein et al., Risk of Re-reporting Among Infants Who Remain at
Home Following Alleged Maltreatment, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1, 2, 9-10 (2014).
105. Id. at 2.
106. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 109; Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1325 n.3.
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rates are extremely high on both tracks, ranging between one-third
to two-thirds, depending on the length of the follow-up period.107
By contrast, research indicates that removal to foster care serves
to protect children from risk. First, the rates of abuse and neglect
are tiny in foster care—less than 1% annually.108 Second, Jill Duerr
Berrick makes a persuasive case that most research, including the
more recent research that attempts to control for important variables, shows foster care removal generally serves children’s best interests in terms of such factors as risk of violence to children, child
“risk behaviors,” child quality of life, and other measures of safety
and well-being.109
The child-friendly reform move would be to strengthen the CPS
system by providing it with significantly more resources and by encouraging increased intervention. That intervention should take the
form of expanded supportive services as well as expanded requirements that parents cooperate with rehabilitative services. It should
take the form of expanded monitoring and, in the most serious cases,
expanded use of the powers to remove children to foster care and to
107. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1, 2, 4.
108. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2012, at 50 tbl.3-16 (2013), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BV7YXC52. The comprehensive federal government report on child maltreatment says that half
of the states met the standard of 99.68% for absence of maltreatment (49% in 2012), and
the rest had higher than 99% absence, except for three states which had absence rates of
98.35% or higher. Id. Not a single state fell below 98.35%. Id.
109. JILL DUERR BERRICK, TAKE ME HOME 108-17 (2009). The major exception was one
study indicating that in cases considered “marginal,” children may do better at home than
suffering the disruption and uncertainty that often accompanies foster care placement. Id.
at 110-11. While one recent article claims that “numerous studies” show foster care produces more harm, the author cites only two studies, and Berrick’s analysis demonstrates
that they are of limited relevance. The study Berrick characterizes as the best is one by
Taussig, Clyman, and Landsverk. See e-mail from Jill Duerr Berrick, Zellerbach Family
Found., Professor, Univ. of Cal. at Berkley, to Daniel Heimpel (Sept. 25, 2013, 01:42 AM)
(on file with author). They find, consistent with prior research, significantly worse outcomes for reunified children and conclude:
There was, and continues to be, a pervasive belief that reunification is best for
children, despite the lack of research to support this assertion. . . . Evaluation
of child welfare policy and practice should be based . . . on the impact of . . . [reunification] on behavioral health outcomes for children. . . . [A]n often missed
voice in the debate about what is in the best interest for children in foster care
is the voice of the youth themselves. Studies that have interviewed current and
former foster children report that the youth generally had positive feelings
about being placed in foster care. Most youth thought it was in their best interest and reported that things would have gotten worse at home without child
welfare intervention.
Heather N. Taussig et al., Children Who Return Home From Foster Care: A 6-Year Prospective Study of Behavioral Health Outcomes in Adolescence, PEDIATRICS, July 2001, at 6,
available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/108/1/e10.full.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/ND4W-8KN8 (citations omitted).
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terminate parental rights. England has been moving in just this direction since the highly publicized death of a young child kept at
home with his mother and is now celebrating the increase in the
number of children adopted out of foster care as a triumph for child
well-being.110
DR is, of course, designed to move in the exact opposite direction,
diverting the great majority of CPS cases to the voluntary AR system, reducing CPS funding, and as a consequence, reducing all forms
of CPS support and intervention.
B. New Risks From Differential Response
The DR move to divert some 70% of CPS cases to a purely voluntary track111 and to reduce CPS funding dramatically by diverting
CPS funds to the DR track, poses obvious and serious risks to child
well-being.
1. Risks from Diversion to Voluntary Track
(a) Serious Risk Cases on the Voluntary Track
i. Diverted Cases are Serious Risk by Definition Given Nature of
CPS Caseload
As discussed above,112 most cases on the traditional CPS caseload
are cases in which children face serious risks. Diverting the great
majority of CPS cases to a voluntary track where parents are free to
simply walk away—escaping any mandatory monitoring, required
rehabilitative treatment, and potential for child removal—poses obvious risks to children. This is why DR advocates have always felt
compelled to defend their systems as not likely to increase safety
risks. Their arguments are not persuasive.
DR advocates claim that only low-risk cases will be diverted and
point to the fact that most CPS cases are in the neglect category as
evidence that a majority of cases can be safely diverted.113 The simple
110. See, e.g., Angela Harrison, Adoptions Show ‘Record’ Increase, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26,
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-24282211, archived at http://perma.cc/PNC8UVE; see also Mary Welstead, Child Protection in England – Early Intervention 2-3 (May
10-11, 2012) (unpublished workshop article) (on file with the Harvard Law School as part
of the Prevention and Protection Brainstorming Workshop), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/cap/cap-conferences/pp-workshop/ppmaterials/27_welsteaddoc.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5QZL-QJBD (stating how there
was public outrage after a child’s death in England and that the public called for measures
to ensure child safety).
111. See supra note 49.
112. See discussion supra Part III.A.
113. Amy Conley, Differential Response: A Critical Examination of a Secondary Prevention Model, 29 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1454, 1456 (2007); C. Nicole Lawrence et

2015]

DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE

599

categorization of a case as neglect is a major factor in DR decisions to
track them as AR cases.114 But it is frivolous to contend that neglect
cases are by definition minor, involving mere poverty or dirty houses.
Children in the neglect category are at risk of dying at rates roughly
equal to those in the abuse category.115 Most neglect cases involve
parents addicted to drugs and/or alcohol who are incapable of providing the nurturing parenting that children need, until and unless the
parents solve their addiction problems.116 Accordingly, child neglect
often means the kind of traumatic stress that “literally change[s] the
architecture of the child’s brain systems in ways that may permanently impair the child’s functioning in every domain of development—sensory, emotional, cognitive, and social.”117 Many neglect
cases involve abuse issues categorized as neglect simply because the
latter is easier to prove.118
Even assuming that some cases now on the CPS caseload are truly
minor and pose limited risk to children, this characterization does
not fit a significant percentage and certainly nothing approaching the
70% DR diversion goal.
ii. Absence of Investigation Means No Ability to Identify Which
Cases Are Serious Versus Minor
DR programs have no way of identifying which cases are truly less
risky, warranting diversion to the voluntary track. As discussed
above,119 DR prides itself on not conducting at the outset, in making
the decision of how to track cases, the fact-finding investigation that
would be needed to determine which are the high-risk as compared to
the low-risk cases. There is no effort to determine whether the alleged maltreatment took place and, if so, who the perpetrator was
and what the underlying family dynamics were. Nor is there an investigation once the case is put on the AR track, since any focus on
al., Multiple Response System: Evaluation of Policy Change in North Carolina’s Child
Welfare System, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 2355, 2355-56 (2011) (showing that
neglect cases are generally assigned to the AR track in various DR systems).
114. See, e.g., Hughes et al., supra note 6, at 501 (noting that one state reportedly
tracked all neglect referrals to AR).
115. See Fatalities Due to Child Abuse and Neglect, AM. HUMANE ASS’N,
http://www.americanhumane.org/children/stop-child-abuse/fact-sheets/fatalities-due-to-childabuse-neglect.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6BWW-W4VP.
116. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 67-68.
117. Frank E. Vandervort et al., Building Resilience in Foster Children: The Role of the
Child’s Advocate, 32 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J., 1, 4 (2012); see generally CHARLES A. NELSON ET
AL., ROMANIA’S ABANDONED CHILDREN (2014) (reviewing brain science and demonstrating
the devastating impact of neglect on early development).
118. See generally, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 65-67 (discussing how neglect
cases are extremely serious, and that CPS often use the neglect category because it is
easier to prove than abuse).
119. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
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what the parents might have done to the child is considered inconsistent with the parent-friendly ethic, as is any separate interview of
the child or other witnesses.
Common sense alone is enough to make this absence of investigation suspect. If a child has a suspicious burn, asking the child in front
of the parent whether the burn resulted from an accident or from a
parent’s deliberate application of a hot iron is not likely to produce an
honest answer, if the child is indeed at risk of violence from the parent. If police respond to an emergency call involving domestic violence and find a woman injured and weeping, would anyone today
think it appropriate to insist that no separate interview of the woman be conducted and that, instead, the man and woman be kept together for a family-friendly assessment of future risks so as to decide
on the appropriate response?
Professional expertise confirms that fact-finding investigations
designed to figure out what actually took place in connection with the
alleged maltreatment—including separate interviews of the child in a
safe-feeling neutral space—are key elements of an appropriate assessment of future risk to the child.120 Several workshops at a recent
colloquium given by the leading professional association on child
maltreatment, the American Professional Society on the Abuse of
Children (APSAC), emphasized the importance of such investigations
and revealed the degree to which separate interviews of the child are
the accepted professional mantra.121 Michigan has a law requiring
that children be interviewed separately.122
Many in the child welfare field have emphasized in recent years
the importance of increasing the depth and scope of traditional CPS
investigations, enabling CPS workers to make better decisions as to
the appropriate response. They note the importance of including the
“history of child maltreatment” in that assessment.123 They promote
the use of multidisciplinary teams that “interview and examine fami-

120. See, e.g., Hughes et al., supra note 6, at 501 (“[F]ormal risk assessments—
particularly the more reliable and valid actuarial risk assessments—are difficult to complete fully or accurately without face-to-face family contact and a deeper exploration of a
family’s circumstances, including the presence and dynamics of previous maltreatment.”
(internal citation omitted)); Vaughan-Eden & Vandervort, supra note 39, at 551 (“Obviously, one primary problem is that CPS cannot know which families will fall into this [risk]
category until it has conducted an investigation. . . . [A]bsent such an investigation, children’s safety cannot be assured.”).
121. See, e.g., Julie Kenniston & Rita Farrell, First Responder Interviews: Called by So
Many Names, but How Should I Really Be Doing Them?, AM. PROF’L SOC’Y ON THE ABUSE
OF CHILD. (May 22, 2014), http://www.apsac.org/assets/documents/2014_Colloquium/
2014_Handouts/32%20workshop.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EJZ3-E3BP.
122. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.628c (2014).
123. Vandervort et al., supra note 117, at 8.

2015]

DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE

601

ly members in an effort to determine the likelihood, nature, and/or
extent of child maltreatment and develop an intervention plan.”124
The Federal Government has weighed in on the need for more
careful, in-depth factual assessments. The Children’s Bureau has
said that “[a]ssessment forms the foundation of effective practice
with children and families[]”125 and found in its most recent Child
and Families Services Review that CPS agencies were too often “not
sufficiently comprehensive to capture underlying family issues, such
as substance abuse, mental illness, and domestic violence, that may
contribute to maltreatment.”126
Many child welfare systems have sought to provide increasing
protection to children by combining civil child protection services
with law enforcement approaches, enabling more thorough investigations and more comprehensive responses.127 One prosecutor expressed her concern with the move to adopt DR as follows:
I am deeply disturbed by the impact this will have on our ability to
protect children. . . . With DR, . . . child services are now prohibited
from sharing information with law enforcement, and prosecutors.
This will have a terrible impact on our ability to protect the children that fall within . . . [the DR] category . . . .128

This is not to say that the full forensic investigation thought appropriate in criminal child abuse cases is required in all child welfare
cases. But a meaningful inquiry into the facts that enables child welfare workers to know what happened in the past, so as to illuminate
future risk, is required.
The social science supports common sense and professional expertise in making the absence of a fact-finding investigation troubling.
There is a general consensus among serious students of the child
welfare system, based on extensive evidence, that the best predictor

124. Kathleen Coulborn Faller et al., Can Early Assessment Make a Difference in Child
Protection? Results from a Pilot Study, 2 J. OF PUB. CHILD WELFARE 71, 73 (2008).
WELFARE
INFO.
GATEWAY,
125. Family-Centered
Assessment,
CHILD
https://www.childwelfare.gov/famcentered/caseworkpractice/assessment.cfm (last visited
Feb. 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/M7VB-2UB9.
126. DIANE DEPANFILIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD NEGLECT: A
GUIDE FOR PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION app. D, at 102 (2006), available
at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/neglect/neglect.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/X78X-FXNF.
127. The CAPTA requires this as part of the state’s plan in order to receive federal
funding. See Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-36, 117 Stat.
800 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a) (2006)).
128. E-mail from Christine O. Corken, Attorney, First Assistant, Dubuque Cnty., to
author (Mar. 21, 2014, 2:46 PM) (on file with author).
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of whether child maltreatment will occur in the future is whether it
has occurred in the past.129
AR’s failure to make factual findings documenting in CPS files
that maltreatment has occurred and its failure to list perpetrators on
maltreatment registries pose additional safety issues. If children are
reported in the future as being victimized again, social workers and
others will be denied the best evidence of the need for protective intervention. As but one indication of the problem, the federal government monitors state child welfare systems for maltreatment recurrence and uses as a measure of recurrence the substantiation of maltreatment after a previous substantiated report. By definition, any
maltreatment that parents on the AR track are responsible for will
not be substantiated; and accordingly, any subsequent maltreatment,
even if substantiated, will not count for purposes of this federal
measure of child safety.130
iii. Evidence to Date Indicates Serious Risk Cases Are in Fact
Diverted to the Voluntary Track
There is increasing evidence in the research on DR that many of
the cases diverted to the AR track are, in fact, characterized by serious rather than minor risk. One California DR study found that almost half of the AR sample cases analyzed in the program were either “high risk” or “very high risk,” despite the claimed goals of diverting only low-risk cases.131

129. Rosemary Chalk, Background Paper: Major Research Advances Since the Publication of the 1993 NRC Report Understanding Child Abuse and Neglect: Highlights from the
Literature, in IOM/NRC 2012 RESEARCH WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 158. The
Children’s Research Center, responsible for the extensive work on Structured Decision
Making, found based on years of research designed to build reliable risk assessment instruments that prior maltreatment was the most relevant risk factor in estimating the
likelihood of future maltreatment. See e-mail from Judith S. Rycus, Program Dir., Inst. of
Human Servs., N. Am. Res. Ctr. for Child Welfare, to Frank E. Vandervort, Clinical Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., and Daniel Heimpel (June 1, 2014, 11:55 PM) (on file with author); see also Daniel Heimpel, Not for Your Consideration, THE CHRONICLE OF SOC.
CHANGE
(June
3,
2014),
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/news/not-for-yourconsideration/6875?print=1, archived at http://perma.cc/3B32-WS4A (quoting experts to the
effect that prior maltreatment and reports of same are the best predictors of future
maltreatment).
130. See MGMT. AUDIT COMM., DEP’T OF FAMILY SERVS., WYOMING CHILD PROTECTIVE
SERVICES
26
(2008)
available
at
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/progeval/reports/
2008/CPS/CPSfullreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6W85-8NCV; U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1998: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL CHILD
ABUSE
AND
NEGLECT
DATA
SYSTEM,
ch.
1.2
(1998),
available
at
http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm98/cpt1.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/
RB5Q-9P87;.Piper, supra note 55, at 9-10.
131. Conley & Berrick, supra note 101, at 289.
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Even the advocacy research that purports to find DR successful
documents the serious risk characterizing many cases on the AR
track. A 2010 Ohio study found that almost half of the AR cases had
at least one past report of abuse and neglect, and almost 15% had
four or more prior reports.132 A recent Colorado study noted that 76%
of the AR cases were medium risk and 10% were high risk.133
The research also shows that ongoing maltreatment rates on the
AR tracks are extremely high. The California study noted above reveals a one-third re-report rate within the brief nine-month AR
treatment period.134 Even the lead authors of the early advocacy research supporting DR, Tony Loman and Gary Siegel, note the “high
rates of recidivism.”135 Their 2014 Ohio Report shows that roughly
half of all AR families received at least one subsequent family risk
assessment.136 Their 2004 Minnesota Report says the overall rereport rate is about one in three families during a relatively short
tracking period of two to three years.137 It predicts that long-term
rates would rise to something like the general CPS recurrence rate of
65%.138 In an interview, Tony Loman indicated that typically in his
DR research, he found an unduly high re-report rate, noting that in
the Missouri DR program, the rate was 50% to 60% after five to seven years.139
And while the DR system is supposed to have a method for sending high-risk cases back from the AR to the TR track, this rarely
happens as discussed above—available evidence indicates that only a
tiny percentage of AR cases are sent back to the TR track based on
social worker reevaluation of safety risk.140 Richard Barth, a highly
132. L. ANTHONY LOMAN ET AL., INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, OHIO ALTERNATIVE
RESPONSE
EVALUATION
FINAL
REPORT
42
fig.4.6
(2010),
available
at
http://www.iarstl.org/papers/OhioAREvaluation.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8SA5-AD87.
133. See, e.g., WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 41 tbl.4.3.
134. Conley & Berrick, supra note 101, at 286.
135. L. Anthony Loman & Gary L. Siegel, Effects of Anti-Poverty Services Under the
Differential Response Approach to Child Welfare, 34 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1659,
1666 (2012). For discussion of Loman’s and Siegel’s roles in the DR movement, see discussion infra Part IV.
136. See L. ANTHONY LOMAN & GARY L. SIEGEL, INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, OHIO
ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE EVALUATION EXTENSION: FINAL REPORT viii (2014), available at
http://www.americanhumane.org/assets/pdfs/children/differential-response/pc-dr-ohiosection2-final-evaluation-report-1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZAP7-7CZ4.
137. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 136, at 141-42.
138. Id. A recent Loman and Siegel Ohio study reveals that nearly half of the families
in the combined group of AR and TR cases had one or more screened-in re-reports. Loman & Siegel, supra note 61, at 8.
139. Telephone Interview with L. Anthony Loman (Oct. 18, 2013). L. Anthony Loman is
a research director at the Institute of Applied Research in St. Louis, Missouri.
140. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (noting that only 0.3% to 5.6% of child welfare
cases in the states and counties assessed are moved from an AR track to a TR track based
on such reevaluation).
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respected child welfare expert, says that unless AR cases are referred
back “a substantial amount of the time (25% perhaps), then the system isn’t working.”141
(b) Voluntary Track Inappropriate for Serious Risk Cases
i. Need for Monitoring, Supportive and Rehabilitative Services,
and for Protective Intervention Authority
DR proponents claim that voluntary will work better than coercive, because parents will respond to the parent-friendly approach by
cooperating with services. They bolster their case by pointing to the
research that allegedly shows AR track parents receive more services
and appear to be more positively engaged with their workers than TR
track parents.
But there is every reason to think that the children on the AR
track in the cases involving serious risk are more likely to suffer ongoing maltreatment because of the entirely voluntary nature of the
system.
First, as discussed above, most parents charged with maltreatment have fallen into serious dysfunctional patterns that often include a combination of substance abuse and addiction, domestic violence, and mental illness.142 Few will be able to escape those patterns
on their own volition. While there are limited helpful studies of the
comparative benefits of voluntary versus coercive programs, some
evidence in the area of substance abuse treatment indicates that coercion works better.143 Tellingly, in the 2004 Minnesota DR study,
when AR workers were asked which parents were least likely to benefit from AR, the most common response was parents involved in
substance abuse.144

141. E-mail from Richard Barth, Dean, University of Maryland School of Social Work,
to author (July 1, 2014, 9:35 PM) (on file with author). Barth served as a consultant to the
IOM/NRC project discussed below, and its report cites his concerns regarding the low
switch rate. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
142. See supra Part III.A.
143. See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 219, 286-87 n.21 (“[S]uch research as exists
indicates that coercive pressure is in fact useful.”); Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1337 n.43
(citing family drug court expert comments at the Prevention and Protection Workshop held
at Harvard Law School on May 11, 2012); see also Piper, supra note 55, at 27 (stating that
most studies show mandatory programs work better than voluntary ones for substance
abuse treatment enrollment and retention but not for long-term abstinence, and also noting that these studies involve non-equivalent comparison groups making conclusions regarding effectiveness problematic).
144. L. ANTHONY LOMAN & GARY L. SIEGEL, INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, MINNESOTA
ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE EVALUATION: FINAL REPORT 68 (2004), available at
http://www.iarstl.org/papers/ARFinalEvaluationReport.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/6GTV-SLKZ.
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Second, once parents are identified as maltreating their children,
research shows that services are unlikely to enable them to recover
from their problems sufficiently to avoid ongoing maltreatment.145
The traditional CPS system’s authority to impose monitoring by social workers, to require cooperation with rehabilitative treatment,
and in the most serious cases, to remove children and terminate parental rights, enables it to protect children when parents pose ongoing threats to child safety and well-being.146
ii. The Dropout Problem: Highest Risk Cases Most Likely to Drop
Out
In addition, we know that the highest-risk parents are those most
likely to drop out and that they will drop out at very high rates. This
means that they will not receive the AR track services and will not
engage with the AR workers in the ways meant to assure us that the
risk of maltreatment will be reduced. It means that they will escape
any monitoring by AR social workers and any attention by workers
connected with AR-related social service programs that might provide the potential for child maltreatment being noticed and reported.
All of this means, in turn, that their children will have seriously reduced opportunities for protective intervention in the event that their
safety and well-being are threatened.
The research on Early Home Visitation has taught us enough to
be concerned about the potential DR dropout problem. Home Visitation programs have similar goals to DR, including the reduction of
child maltreatment. They serve similarly troubled populations, offer
a range of supportive services, and operate on a similar voluntary
model, with parents free to reject participation without consequence.147 They have been studied extensively for decades. The best of
the programs, with the best evidence of success in helping to reduce
the risk of maltreatment, have extremely high dropout rates—between
one-third and one-half of all those parents targeted.148
A thorough 2014 report on Early Home Visitation by Mathematica
Policy Research and Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago149 re145. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 109-10; Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1337-38; Harriet
L. MacMillan et al., Effectiveness of Home Visitation by Public-Health Nurses in Prevention
of the Recurrence of Child Physical Abuse and Neglect: A Randomised Controlled Trial, 365
LANCET 1786, 1792 (2005) (showing that a model home visitation program, promising in
reducing the likelihood of maltreatment among first-time parents, had no success in reducing maltreatment among parents once identified as having victimized their children).
146. See Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1337-38.
147. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 163-75.
148. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 169-70, 277 n.17, 1353 n.85.
149. See generally KIMBERLY BOLLER ET AL., MAKING REPLICATION WORK: BUILDING
INFRASTRUCTURE TO IMPLEMENT, SCALE-UP, AND SUSTAIN EVIDENCE-BASED EARLY
CHILDHOOD HOME VISITING PROGRAMS WITH FIDELITY (2014), available at
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veals the extent of the problem. Dropout rates for the long-term programs ranged from 27% to 42% at the twelve-month stage.150 Families typically received only half of the home visits expected.151 In the
very successful Nurse Family Partnership program, only 45% to 62%
of the planned visits were achieved.152 The report summarizes that
just over half of the families in all of the studied home visitation programs remained in services for at least twelve months, and about
two-thirds of the families in the three long-term programs remained
in services, noting that these rates are consistent with, and may exceed, participation rates reported in previous research.153
Moreover, this report shows that the Home Visitation dropouts are
disproportionately those parents most at risk of maltreating their
children.154 The reasons given for dropping out from Early Home Visitation programs are very significant in understanding DR safety
risks. Among the primary reasons are “drug abuse, [or] fear [that a]
home visitor will observe child abuse or illegal behavior.”155
DR advocacy research has avoided any focus on the troublesome
dropout problem. But careful reading of this research reveals what is
to be expected: a very high dropout rate with the dropouts apparently
characterized as particularly high risk. For example, the 2011 New
York DR Report says that 31% of the AR track parents were willing
to listen but did not act on the worker’s recommendations or service
offers, and another 6% were completely uninterested or dismissive.156
A Minnesota CPS spokesperson says that only half of the state’s AR
track parents chose to participate.157
Moreover, the recent QIC-DR research, discussed below,158 demonstrates both the high rate of dropouts and the high-risk nature of
these dropouts. This is the only DR research to focus any attention
on this issue.
http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/documents/EBHV_MakingReplication_Final.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/F35T-54MM (reporting on early child home visiting programs).
150. See id. at 38 tbl.III.5.
151. Id. at 79.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 80.
154. Id. at xvi (“Higher-risk families were more likely to leave the program early.”); see
also id. at xviii (finding that families with the most challenges were most likely to leave the
program). Those identified as high risk are the same as those regularly identified as having
the greatest risk for maltreatment: younger, more economically disadvantaged, and more
socially isolated participants, including single parents. Id. at 25, 80.
155. Id. at 39, 80.
156. RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 58.
157. Brandon Stahl, Counties ‘Screen Out’ Most Child Abuse Reports, STAR TRIBUNE
(Apr. 20, 2014, 11:48 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local/255888251.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/9KKZ-H5J3.
158. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.a.
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2. Risks From Reducing Financial Support for Traditional CPS
DR proponents claim that by removing the low-risk cases to the
voluntary track, CPS will be able to provide better protection to the
children at the highest risk.
But this claim is belied by the DR finance reform agenda. The
strategy for financing DR relies on significantly reducing federal foster care funding and CPS resources more generally, so that in fact
CPS would have greatly reduced capacity to protect the children on
its caseload.159
The child-friendly reform move would be to expand resources for
CPS. These resources have shrunk in recent years because of the
2008 recession and related federal, state, and local budget cuts.160
This has had its own impact on child safety.
Further reducing funds for the resource-starved CPS system will
put children at a newly frightening level of risk. Common sense supported by available evidence suggests that CPS will do a better job
protecting children if it is given adequate resources to pay its social
workers, reduce caseloads, conduct investigations, provide services,
collect evidence, take cases to court as necessary to remove children,
place and maintain them safely in foster care, and in appropriate
cases terminate parental rights.161
There is already some evidence that DR is adversely affecting
child safety because of this diversion of funds from CPS. In Connecticut, a court monitor supervising the child welfare system reported in
the fall of 2013: “ ‘Front line staffing levels are inadequate given the
complexity of cases that now make up the pool of investigation and
ongoing service cases that social workers have on their caseloads
since the implementation of the Differential Response System.’ ”162
Research reports document CPS worker complaints that they are
overburdened as a result of the diversion of resources to AR.163 Concerns about how this diversion has threatened the safety of children
159. See discussion supra Part II.B.
160. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 32.
161. See, e.g., Cross et al., supra note 50, at 35 (stating that limited CPS resources are
associated with lower substantiation rates, lower ongoing services rates, and lower child
placement rates); Faller et al., supra note 124, at 73 (noting that because of the paucity of
resources, CPS screens out children needing services, conducts narrowly focused investigations, denies cases in which children need help, and closes cases right after substantiation);
Jenifer McKim, A Wave of Infants Lost in DCF Families, BOS. GLOBE (July 13, 2014),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/07/12/babies-under-department-children-andfamilies-supervision-suffer-sleep-related-deaths-alarming-rate/kQ5BbcvJFmzUfV6KH6
IzDN/story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y7WJ-HXUK.
162. Heimpel, supra note 7 (quoting COURT MONITOR RAYMOND MANCUSCO, JUAN F. V.
MALLOY EXIT PLAN QUARTERLY REPORT 4 (2013), available at www.ct.gov/dcf/lib/
dcf/positive_outcomes/pdf/2nd_qtr_report_2013_final_(2).pdf)).
163. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.b.
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on the CPS caseload have been a factor leading a number of states to
eliminate their DR programs.164
One proffered rationale for this federal finance move is an old
chestnut in the family preservation arsenal. DR proponents claim
that a disproportionate amount of federal funding goes to removing
children from their parents for maltreatment as opposed to preventing maltreatment in the first place.165 One problem with this argument is that the calculus is based on false factual assumptions—on
the omission of many very significant federal sources of funds for
prevention. Casey and others typically rely on a comparison between the Title IV-E funds provided by the federal government for
foster care and the IV-B funds provided for prevention services, as if
this proved their case.166 But this entirely ignores all of the federal
funds provided for prevention services through welfare and other
programs.167
Also, Casey poses a false choice between funding for prevention
services and funding for children in out-of-home care. This is the
choice only if finance reform is done cheaply, in a budget-neutral
way, with no new resources dedicated to child welfare. Breaking with
long-standing tradition among child welfare advocates, Casey has
repeatedly declined to call for new funding, instead assuring policymakers that finance reform can and should be done at no cost to the
federal government.168
Casey’s position is, of course, completely consistent with its 2020
foster care reduction goal. Casey believes that reducing funding for
foster care will create compelling fiscal incentives for states to limit
foster care usage.
Another problem with the rationale for DR finance reform is that
DR has little to do with true maltreatment prevention. There is some
evidence that prevention programs like Early Home Visitation actually work to prevent maltreatment from occurring in the first place.169
164. See infra Conclusion.
165. See generally William C. Bell et al., Guest: Strengthen Investment in Families to
Help Foster Children, SEATTLE TIMES (June 5, 2013), http://www.seattletimes.com/
opinion/guest-strengthen-investment-in-families-to-help-foster-children/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/9S2R-4L9D (discussing how more funds ought to be taken from foster care
services and put into early intervention services).
166. CASEY FAMILY FOUNDATION, MOVING TOWARD HOPE: PATHS TO KEEP CHILDREN
SAFE, MAKE FAMILIES STRONG AND BUILD SUPPORTIVE COMMUNITIES 9-10 (2013).
167. See Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 34-38 (providing the following list of funding sources for prevention services: Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF); Social Services Block Grants; the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood
Home Visiting Program; Medicaid; and the CAPTA).
168. See Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 39.
169. See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 166-68 (describing the promising research
on Early Home Visitation programs); Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1347 n.69 (citing more
recent Home Visitation research).

2015]

DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE

609

But DR operates after maltreatment has occurred and is designed to
keep children identified as victims of abuse and neglect with their
parents, free from any CPS intervention. There is little evidence
showing the success of supportive service programs targeted at families in which abuse and neglect has already occurred, and indeed,
there is extensive evidence that most of them fail. Such children are
re-victimized at rates ranging between one-third and one-half when
kept at home or returned home from foster care.170
We must continue to provide services to families in which there is
significant reason to hope that parents who have committed maltreatment can do what it takes to become fit and nurturing. We
should, indeed, clearly expand such funds. Federal finance reform
designed to provide additional funds for at-home services would be an
important step in enabling these efforts. But we should do this within
the context of the CPS system so that it can act to protect children as
necessary, using its authority to monitor families, require cooperation with treatment plans, remove children to foster care, and terminate parental rights.
IV. RESEARCH ISSUES IN DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE:
THE CORRUPT MERGER OF ADVOCACY WITH RESEARCH
The research picture reflects the problematic pattern of prior history, as discussed above.171 First, most of the research is designed to
justify moving in the DR direction, rather than to honestly assess
whether DR serves child interests and other important goals. It is
designed to persuade policymakers to adopt DR, rather than to enable them to decide whether they should do so. This research, referred
to here as the “advocacy research,” purports to take child safety into
consideration, but it is not actually designed to assess DR in terms of
child safety or broader measures of child well-being. It ignores issues
that would be an obvious focus for attention if the goal really were to
assess DR’s impact on children.
Second, most of the research is produced by people and organizations with powerful links to those promoting DR rather than by independent social scientists who are free to pursue the objective facts
that should be of greatest interest to policymakers.
One group of core organizations and individuals has been heavily
involved in both the promotion of DR and the research purporting to
assess its value.172 This group includes Casey Family Programs, the
AHA, the Kempe Center for the Prevention and Treatment of Child
170. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 109; Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1325 n.3; discussion supra Part III.A.
171. See discussion supra Part I.
172. See supra Introduction.
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Abuse and Neglect, and the Institute of Applied Research (IAR). The
AHA, long active in promoting DR,173 also received with the IAR a
grant to supervise the important research project conducted by the
Quality Improvement Center on Differential Response (QIC-DR).174
The AHA later relinquished its QIC-DR role to the Kempe Center,
which also played a role in the earlier DR research.175 The QIC-DR
research was designed to be the culminating research phase that
would provide the basis for persuading the federal government to
make a major shift of funds from CPS to DR. IAR senior analysts
Tony Loman and Gary Siegel had been responsible for most of the
earlier, highly influential DR advocacy research;176 they also worked
as influential consultants to the QIC-DR.177
Casey Family Programs has played a key role in promoting DR, in
supporting DR with funding grants,178 and in the DR advocacy research picture. It has put out advocacy documents, which make an
avid pitch for the DR approach, while claiming at the same time that
DR is supported by the research. These read as some combination of
classic advocacy and research. One such document is “The Differential Response (DR) Implementation Resource Kit,” apparently designed to persuade new jurisdictions to adopt DR and to help them
implement it.179 This Implementation Kit provides a totally positive
view of the research, entirely ignoring the devastating critique of DR
research published by Hughes and Rycus and the related debate
triggered, which is discussed below.180 It also ignores any discussion
of other independent research critical of DR.181 Instead, the Implementation Kit makes the unqualified claim that DR “has demonstrated improvements in family engagement, worker satisfaction,
and community satisfaction and cooperation, while maintaining child
safety.”182 Another such Casey product is the “breakthrough series
collaborative” report on DR in California.183 This report talks of Cali173. See RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 13; Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra
note 11, at 26.
174. WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at ix.
175. Memorandum from Sean Hughes, supra note 11, at 26.
176. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.a.
177. See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.b.
178. For example, Casey Family Programs helped support the Ohio pilot DR program.
See Puckett, supra note 1. Casey also provided funds for the New York program, as did the
Marguerite Casey Foundation. RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 17. See also Introduction for
Casey Family Programs’ central role in DR.
179. See GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 4.
180. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
181. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
182. GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 5.
183. See generally CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 13 (overviewing the Casey
breakthrough collaborative with California on DR).
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fornia’s “compelling vision” involving DR and claims it is “grounded
in research and backed by an outcomes-based accountability system . . . .”184 The report paints a rosy picture throughout.
The problematic merger of policy advocacy with research is further illustrated by the DR conference sponsored by the Kempe Center
in October 2013.185 The conference brochure features DR as a success
story.186 The conference title is “Differential Response: A Catalyst for
Change.”187 The introduction claims: “Research and implementation
experience has shown that, when CPS implements two response
pathways, practice across the child welfare system improves.”188 The
opening keynote features a Casey Family Programs staff member,
and is titled: “What Families Tell Us They Need: Working Together
to Keep Them Strong and Their Children Safe.”189 A closing breakout
session features two Casey Family Programs staff members on “Differential Response: A Review and Summary of the Research Evidence.”190 This session is summarized as follows: “Differential response stands out among child welfare practice approaches because
of the research evidence of its effectiveness . . . .”191
Maryland’s recent decision to adopt DR represents another example of this advocacy-research merger.192 Casey Family Programs
helped stock the state’s advisory council meetings with consultants,
co-sponsored trips to educate Maryland CPS staff about DR programs, distributed reports citing IAR positive research findings, and
then helped IAR get the contract to evaluate Maryland’s new DR
program.193
A. What Child-Friendly Research Would Look Like
Appropriate child welfare research would focus on child welfare
and would be child-friendly. This would mean analyzing the pros and
cons of DR in terms of child safety and well-being.

184. Id. at i.
185. Registration Brochure, Differential Response: A Catalyst for Change, The Kempe
Center’s 8th Annual Conference on Differential Response in Child Welfare 1 (Oct. 22-25,
2013), http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/medicalschool/departments/pediatrics/
subs/can/DR/Documents/DR%20Conference%20Registration%20Brochure.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/64TG-9USM.
186. Id. at 3-16.
187. Id. at 1.
188. Id. at 2.
189. Id. at 5.
190. Id. at 15.
191. Id.
192. Heimpel, supra note 15.
193. Id.
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Child-friendly research would mean, first, assessing overall
whether we should move in the DR direction or in just the opposite
direction, providing more resources to CPS so that it can do a better
job of protecting children. All agree that there are problems with the
current system in terms of its failure adequately to protect children.
There has long been a debate about whether to move in the direction
of greater or lesser intervention by CPS. We could learn a lot that
would be helpful in designing a more child-friendly system by comparing how children do (1) when new resources are devoted to a voluntary track providing supportive services to families, as compared
to (2) when CPS is given equivalent new resources to support families as well as protect children. Such research would help test the
dubious DR assumption that an entirely voluntary system oriented
primarily toward providing support will work better for children than
a system with authority to monitor child safety, require that parents
cooperate with rehabilitative services, and remove children as needed
for their protection.
Second, given the high re-report rates on families on both AR and
TR tracks,194 child-friendly research would focus on the dangers to
children on both tracks and on how we might better protect them.
Again, this argues for assessing how CPS would do if it were provided additional resources.
Third, child-friendly research would focus on the obvious risks DR
poses for children to see whether those risks are real. Such research
would focus on developing methods for accurately assessing the seriousness of the cases diverted to the AR track. It would focus on the
high dropout rate and develop measures for assessing the maltreatment rate along with other indicators of child well-being in this dropout population. It would not rely on re-report rates as indicators of
the extent of actual maltreatment suffered on the AR track, given the
many reasons for concluding that such reports underestimate maltreatment and fail to accurately reflect differences between rates on
AR and TR tracks, including that parents dropping out are subject to
less surveillance by mandated and other potential reporters.195
Finally and most importantly, appropriate child-friendly research
would follow the tradition of true scientific research. It would be conducted by social scientists with no commitment or bias to finding a
success story in DR. Indeed, without such people designing the research, it is impossible to know all of the questions that good research would investigate and to identify all of the flaws in existing
research.

194. See discussion supra Part III.A, infra Parts IV.B.1.d, IV.B.2, IV.B.4.a.i.
195. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1.d, IV.B.2.
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B. Existing Research
1. The Early Advocacy Research
(a) Promotional Nature & Tone
One organization, the IAR, and its two senior analysts, Tony Loman and Gary Siegel, are responsible for most of the influential early
DR research.196 They produced a series of positive reports touting DR
as a success story.197 These reports have been the primary basis for
DR proponents’ claims that DR is an evidence-based program that
the nation’s child welfare systems should embrace.
IAR’s 1997 Report on Missouri’s DR program helped to fuel the
early DR movement, claiming marginally lower rates of child maltreatment recurrence in DR counties, and thus supporting the idea
that DR was consistent with child safety.198 IAR’s 2004 evaluation of
Minnesota’s DR program was also very influential.199 IAR followed
with many other reports, including one on Ohio,200 where Casey Family Programs and the AHA had been heavily involved in DR’s development.201 The IAR research model also influenced DR research conducted by others.202
Only a few of the early studies used random assignment: Missouri,
Minnesota, Ohio, and New York.203 Each of these studies was conducted by IAR except New York, which followed the IAR research model.204
196. See WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 1 nn.1-6 (listing then key research reports,
with five of the six authored by Loman and Siegel). See also Papers & Reports, INST. OF
APPLIED RESEARCH, http://www.iarstl.org/papers.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/M452-9QG7, for the many DR research studies they have conducted over
the years.
197. Id.
198. GARY L. SIEGEL ET AL., INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, MISSOURI FAMILY
ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE DEMONSTRATION: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT 96
tbls.5.5 & 5.6, 105-06, 212 (1997), available at http://www.iarstl.org/papers/MO%20
FAR%20Final%20Report-for%20website.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/76SN-YZQV.
199. See generally LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144 (reporting on their evaluation of
Minnesota’s DR program that involved randomized assignment); Heimpel, supra note 15.
200. See generally LOMAN ET AL., supra note 132 (reporting on their evaluation of
Ohio’s DR program). An updated report was released in 2014. See generally L. ANTHONY
LOMAN & GARY L. SIEGEL, INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, OHIO ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE
EVALUATION EXTENSION: FINAL REPORT (2014), available at http://www.iarstl.org/
papers/OhioARFinalExtensionReportFINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W4EU-E5BQ
(updating previous report on Ohio’s DR program).
201. See Tim Morrison & Noah Dzuba, Differential Response – Draft Report 10 (July
15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). See Papers & Reports, supra note
196, for the various IAR reports.
202. See, e.g., RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 31-40 (employing a model to study DR in
New York similar to IAR reports).
203. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 42, 69.
204. Id. at 21, 42, 69.
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The fact that two people associated with one organization have
received repeated contracts for producing a series of positive research
reports is a problem in itself. A significant percentage of all papers
and reports listed on the IAR website focus on DR.205 IAR, by definition, has an economic bias in favor of churning out repeat versions of
the DR success story. It seems unlikely that it would have received
repeat contracts if its reports had challenged any key DR movement
premises. IAR co-authors Loman and Siegel support DR advocacy
efforts with unabashed enthusiasm. For example, Siegel is quoted in
the Casey Family Programs Implementation Resource Kit, equating
DR with a precociously brilliant child.206 Supporting the creation of
new DR management positions, he says: “Every child needs a parent,
even a child prodigy.”207 This is not the language you would expect an
objective social scientist to use about a program he is responsible for
evaluating.
The research reports read like advocacy, not independent, neutral
social science. There is, for example, no section at the end of the reports discussing “limitations” to warn the reader of the limits of the
research and conclusions that can fairly be drawn or alert the reader
to further research that would be useful in answering important open
questions. The reports regularly include rave reviews of DR. The
2004 Minnesota Report opens its description of study highlights with
the unqualified claim: “Child safety was not compromised” by the AR
approach.208 Its introduction states: “As states seek ways to make
child protection systems more effective, a new paradigm has emerged
with potential to be a major system reform within child protection.”209
The reports regularly argue for expansion of DR even though they
provide very limited evidence of its safety for children. The 2011 New
York Report sums up its key findings, starting with family engagement and satisfaction and ending with the early evidence that AR
cases have similar re-report rates as TR cases. Based on this, together with a prediction that further follow-up will demonstrate a reduction in subsequent AR re-reports, it claims “positive evaluation results” and recommends that the legislature make DR permanent!210

205. Papers & Reports, supra note 196 (listing 12 reports out of 42 listed, or 29%, with
Differential Response in the title).
206. GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7 at 58.
207. Id.
208. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at vi.
209. Id. at 1.
210. RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at v-vii, 103.
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(b) Parent Satisfaction as Measure of Success
When it comes to substance, the early advocacy research fails to
pass the laugh test. At least it fails if you think that child interests
should count as central. Each report places enormous emphasis on
AR’s success in pleasing parents—or what the authors call “families”—without specifying that their definition of families excludes
children. Loman and Siegel, themselves, sum up their work, saying
“The most consistent finding in our work is that, on average, families
react more positively to . . . [AR] than to forensic investigations.”211
Their Minnesota report’s opening highlights summarize: “Most families liked the AR approach and responded more positively to workers
who used it.”212
Notably, although children in DR programs range widely in age and
include a large proportion fully capable of voicing informative opinions,213 no effort is made in the advocacy research to solicit their views.
The sections in this research proclaiming parent satisfaction are
based on surveys of parents on the AR, as compared to the TR,
tracks. Elaborate statistical charts demonstrate that parents on the
AR track tend to like their treatment by CPS workers better than
parents on the TR track. Parents on the AR track are, by definition,
treated only in a parent-friendly way. They are offered services featuring financial subsidies like rent payments and household purchases. They are not investigated to see how they might have mistreated their children. They are not required to do anything. They
are not told that the state can intervene to protect their children if
they do not take the steps needed to become fit parents. Indeed they
are told that they can walk away at any time without consequence.
By contrast parents on the TR track can be required to engage in
substance abuse and other rehabilitative treatment. They know that
if they refuse to cooperate with such demands or if they continue to
abuse and neglect their children, they risk having the children removed. What is not to like from the point of view of most parents diverted to the AR track? How can the IAR authors report this finding
as if it is enormously significant, as if it constitutes important proof of
success?
And yet, sophisticated DR movement strategists have poured
millions of dollars into this research in a deadly-serious effort to
radically change our nation’s child welfare policy. They have appar-

211. L. Anthony Loman & Gary L. Siegel, Hughes et al.: Science or Promotion?, 23 RES.
554, 556 (2013) (emphasis added).
212. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at vi.
213. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 60 (providing that the mean age of
children in three states’ DR systems studied ranged from 5.4 years to 6.4 years).
ON SOC. WORK PRAC.
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ently learned a scary lesson from the prior history discussed above.214
Research findings that seem laughable can have a very significant
effect on policymakers.
(c) Parent Engagement Claims
The early advocacy research claims that parents are actually engaged on the AR track more actively than parents on the TR track
and thus that they receive more in the way of services that might
reduce stress and help them avoid repeat maltreatment.215 There are
a host of problems with this finding.
First, while the research refuses to discuss the dropout problem, it
is clear that both the parent and worker surveys used to measure
parent engagement are based on a highly selective, and by no means
representative, sample of the whole AR group. The surveys are sent
to only those parents who choose to engage in and complete the voluntary AR track program, and out of that group, only a small percentage responds to the survey.216 These parents are almost certainly
those most invested in, and appreciative of, the program. By contrast,
parent engagement for the TR group is measured for all parents on
the track, including those who would much rather not be there. There
is therefore no comparability between the two groups and no evidence
as to the level of engagement of the entire group diverted to AR as
compared to the group kept on the TR track. However, we know that
somewhere in the vicinity of one-third to two-thirds of those in the AR
group are not, in fact, engaged since they dropped out.217
Second, the services provided on the AR, as compared to the TR,
track are significantly different. AR track services are primarily financial benefits such as food or clothing, rent and utilities payments,
and purchases of appliances and other household items, rather than
the kinds of rehabilitative services designed to help unfit parents
become fit like substance abuse treatment, anger management, and
other parental fitness counseling. TR track services involve disproportionately more in the way of such rehabilitative services.218 Even if
the DR research were capable of proving that parents were more engaged in AR services, this would say nothing about whether they
were getting more in the way of services that were actually helpful in
reducing child maltreatment.
214. See supra Part I.
215. See LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at x, 117; RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at v-vi.
216. E.g., LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at 46; MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note
2, at 49.
217. See supra Part III.B.1.b.ii, infra Part IV.B.4.a.ii (discussing dropout rates in
both Parts).
218. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at 52-57 figs.5.1 & 5.2.
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Third, much of the research compares AR programs that have
been given new funding for services and staff to TR programs that
have received no new funding.219 A related issue characterizing virtually all of the research reports is that the social workers on the AR
track have been given special training and directions not provided to
the TR track workers.220
A comparison between tracks with different levels of funding and
different types of training for staff and services proves absolutely nothing about whether a voluntary track would work better than a potentially coercive track in engaging parents and preventing maltreatment.
(d) Child Safety Claims
The early advocacy research claims that child safety is served as
well or better on the AR track as on the TR track, generally relying
primarily on comparative rates of re-reporting of child maltreatment.
The research says that for AR families, these rates are roughly the
same as, and in some cases lower than, the rates for CPS families.221
There are many problems with these safety claims. Most important is that there is no real focus on assessing the obvious risks of
DR by social scientists free from bias,222 so there is no way to tell
what might have surfaced if there had been such a focus.
In addition, many flaws in the safety claims are obvious. First, the
reports imply, but do not actually make clear, that re-report rates for
dropouts are included in the total rates for the AR group. Obviously,
if they are not, then the re-report comparisons are close to meaningless, since as discussed above, the dropouts are likely the highest-risk
group for repeat maltreatment.223

219. So, for example, in the early, influential Minnesota study, new foundation funds
for services were made available to families on the AR but not the TR track. Id. at 19, 66.
The 2010 Ohio study reports that $1000 per family was provided on the AR, but not the
TR, track, crediting Casey Family Programs together with the Ohio Child Welfare Department for the new funding. LOMAN ET AL., supra note 132, at 15. The 2011 New York
DR research report notes that extra funds were provided to families on the AR track.
RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at 17; see also Hughes et al., supra note 6, at 510-13 (reviewing the reports from Minnesota, Ohio, Nevada, and New York in Appendix A). The Final
QIC-DR Report notes that in the later Ohio study, extra funds were provided to the AR
track by both Casey and the QIC-DR grant. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 83.
Casey’s DR Implementation Kit notes that “flexible funds” are generally provided to AR
tracks and are essential to the system. GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 49, 50.
220. See, e.g., RUPPEL ET AL., supra note 5, at iv (discussing the training provided to AR
track social workers).
221. See, e.g., Puckett, supra note 1 (claiming slightly reduced re-report rates in AR
families).
222. See discussion supra Part IV., including IV.A., B.1.a.
223. Tony Loman stated that his research did include the dropout re-report rates.
Telephone Interview with Tony Loman, supra note 139.
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Second, even if dropouts were included in AR re-report totals,
there is no reason to think that re-report rates reflect actual maltreatment rates for the dropout group in the same way that they reflect such rates for the AR participant group or the TR group, and
there is no discussion of this issue. There is good reason to think they
do not. There is a well-known and oft-discussed “surveillance bias”
phenomenon.224 Families visited on a regular basis by social workers
are more likely to be reported because these workers are mandated
reporters.225 Families receiving services are more likely to be connected with community resources with their own mandated reporters.226 Families on the AR track who refuse services from the get-go
will be free from this kind of surveillance, and families who drop out
along the way will be relatively free.
Third, there is also no reason to think that re-reports accurately
capture any differences in actual maltreatment between those who
receive services on the AR track and those on the TR track, and there
is no discussion of this issue. Again, there is good reason to think
they do not. The point of the AR track is to be parent-friendly and not
engage in the type of monitoring and surveillance designed to identify maltreatment that is more characteristic of the TR track. The
workers on the two tracks are differently trained and socialized, and
they operate from different perspectives about their roles. Accordingly, AR workers seem less likely to report for maltreatment parents
with whom they engage than TR workers are to report parents engaging in similar maltreatment.
Fourth, the absence of any fact-finding investigation on the AR
track, any findings about prior abuse and neglect, and any listing on
maltreatment perpetrator registries will likely reduce the rate at
which actual maltreatment is identified in the entire group diverted
to AR, both dropouts and participants. Maltreatment findings are an
important part of what social workers rely on in deciding whether to
conclude that additional maltreatment has occurred and whether to
report. Children on the AR track are less likely to be re-reported for
maltreatment, as compared with children on the TR track, since their
cases will be missing the information about prior incidents that
would exist for similar cases on the TR track.
In addition to the suspect reliance on re-report rates, the research
relies on social worker perceptions of family safety as an important
measure of actual safety in comparing AR families to TR families.227
224. Conley & Berrick, supra note 101, at 289.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 286.
227. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at 105-14; LOMAN ET AL., supra note 132, at 13033, figs.11.2 & 11.3.
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There are many obvious problems with this measure. Among these
are first, the likely bias of the workers who self-select for the AR
track and are trained in ways designed to make sure they are true
believers. Second, the worker assessments are based on the parents
who have volunteered to participate to the end of the services period,
at which point the only families left will be those that are most enthusiastic about the program and likely to be the lowest-risk families
in the AR pool.
Finally, the research almost entirely ignores the huge safety risk
posed to children as evidenced by the very high re-report rates characterizing both the AR and TR tracks. It mentions these rates, at
best, only in passing, so that the normal reader would not even notice. But the problematic facts appear incidentally in at least some of
the reports. As discussed above in section III.B.1.a.iii, re-report rates
for AR families range from one-third to two-thirds, depending on the
length of the follow-up period. For example, the 2004 Minnesota Report says the overall re-report rate is about one in three families during a relatively short tracking period of two to three years.228 It predicts that long-term rates would rise to something like the general
CPS recurrence rate of 65%.229 So claims of DR’s success are based on
a prediction that children on the AR track will be likely to be rereported for maltreatment at something at least close to a two-thirds
rate! We have to assume that actual safety risks are even higher than
these re-report rates suggest, since re-reports significantly underestimate maltreatment.230
The overall high re-report rate deserves center stage in any report
truly focused on child safety and well-being. The overwhelming majority of children kept at home, whether on the AR or TR track, suffer
repeated abuse and neglect. This is no surprise given that we have
known for years that children once victimized by maltreatment are
highly likely to be re-victimized.231 But it calls out for comparing how
children might do in a CPS reform program that moves in the opposite direction from DR, providing more rather than less in the way of

228. LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at 141-42.
229. Id. A recent Loman and Siegel Ohio study reveals that nearly half of the families
in the combined group of AR and TR cases had one or more screened-in re-reports. Loman & Siegel, supra note 60, at 93.
230. See, e.g., IOM/NRC 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 205-06 (noting the critical
need for studies that do not rely on re-report rates in assessing child safety); see KOHL,
supra note 29, at 3 (stating that recurrent maltreatment is underreported based on
comparisons with self-reports); KOHL, supra note 29, at 5, 6, 8, 31 (noting very significant underreporting of maltreatment, including severely violent and neglectful parenting, citing her own study and previous research); Kyte et al., supra note 50, at 126, 131;
discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
231. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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intervention, more monitoring, more rehabilitative treatment, and
readier removal in response to serious abuse and neglect.
(e) Cost-Savings Claims
The early advocacy research reports typically end with sections
assessing DR costs and benefits.232 Again, the focus is one which largely ignores child interests. It also ignores long-term costs to the state.
The reports indicate that in the early years of DR programs the
costs of the AR track are often greater than those of the TR track.
But they claim that the DR system will be likely to reduce financial
costs in later years. This claim is based almost entirely on anticipated reductions in removal to foster care associated with DR and, to a
lesser degree, on reductions in other traditional CPS activities like
investigations.233
But the reports simply assume that eliminating investigations and
reducing foster care are good things, with no analysis whatsoever of
whether it serves or disserves child interests. As discussed above,234
good social science provides reason to think that, as a general matter,
reducing the rate of removal to foster care will be harmful to children, putting them at greater risk for additional maltreatment and
related problems. And to the extent that DR increases these longterm risks to children, it will prove enormously costly to society in
financial terms.235
2. The Independent Research
Relatively few studies out of the entire body of DR research can be
characterized as independent from the DR movement and free from
the advocacy spirit animating the research described above. But all of
these independent research studies have a very different character
and message from the advocacy research.
Amy Conley’s and Jill Duerr Berrick’s 2010 California DR Report236 is filled with important cautions. They note that taking together all of the DR research done to date, the findings are “equivocal”237 by contrast to the success story claimed in the advocacy research. They point out that while DR systems are supposed to divert
only low-risk cases to the AR track, they in fact regularly divert
many “high-risk” and “very-high-risk” cases,238 with almost half of the
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See, e.g., LOMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 144, at 158-66.
LOMAN ET AL., supra note 132, at 154.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part V.B; see also infra text accompanying note 350.
Conley & Berrick, supra note 101.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 283, 289.
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cases in their own studies falling in these categories. They note that
many DR approaches gaining support across the country “offer little
more than referrals to community resources.”239 They flag the dropout
issue, noting that “more than half of the families who were offered . . . [AR] services did not opt to participate in the program.”240
They point out that this dropout problem limits the relevance of comparisons between AR and TR groups.241 And they note the high rereport rate characterizing both AR and TR track families—roughly
one-third—with re-reports occurring sooner in the AR group.242
Conley and Berrick conclude with a stunningly different overall
assessment of DR’s “success” from that of the advocacy research.
They find that while DR may provide families needed support, there
is no reason to think it is useful in reducing child maltreatment.243
Some recent state research reports question the success of their
own states’ DR programs. The Wyoming Legislative Service Office
includes in its 2008 report’s “principal findings” that DR is “not effective in reducing families’ severity of contacts” and that families on
the voluntary track “rarely accepted services and their problems often worsened.”244 It recommends that CPS “evaluate how to make the
track system effective or seek its repeal.”245 It finds that the traditional CPS response is more successful than the AR approach in improving child welfare.246 It concludes that the AR system “is not improving families’ lots, and worse, that it may very well leave children
in chronic low-level maltreatment situations until their predicaments
worsen to the investigation level.”247
The Virginia Department of Social Service’s 2008 evaluation of
DR, conducted with the assistance of Virginia Tech, finds serious
problems.248 It notes that the majority of AR cases—54%—are high or
moderate risk.249 It finds that AR families are less likely to accept
services than TR families.250
239. Id. at 290.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 289 (indicating that there is no way to know that those who continued in the
program were similar to those who dropped out since “[c]lients who were more troubled
may have been more likely to opt for treatment, or alternatively, clients who were better
prepared to change their parenting may have chosen to participate” (emphasis added)).
242. Id. at 286.
243. Id. at 290.
244. MGMT. AUDIT COMM., supra note 130; see also id. at 21-22.
245. Id. at Executive Summary.
246. Id. at 24-25.
247. Id. at 30.
248. EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE SYSTEM, supra note 57.
249. Id. at 14.
250. Id. at 24.
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The highly respected Institute of Medicine and National Research
Council (IOM/NRC) issued a Research Workshop Summary in 2012
designed to sum up important child maltreatment research as a preliminary step to revising the IOM’s 1993 Maltreatment Research
Report.251 It states that the DR research studies “have not been able
to rule out the possibility that increased harm might occur.”252 It cites
important questions raised by its consultant Richard Barth, Dean of
the School of Social Work at the University of Maryland, including:
(1) whether the early research findings would be vindicated by “more
rigorous evaluation designs,” and (2) why so few cases were being
switched from AR to TR tracks based on safety concerns.253
In 2014, the IOM/NRC Final Report was published.254 The Report
notes that the number of rigorous evaluations is low and that more
rigorous evaluations are needed.255 (It specifies that just three randomized, controlled trials, and seven quasi-experimental studies, had
been conducted.)256 And it emphasizes: “Perhaps most critically, there
is a need for studies that do not rely solely on administrative [rereport] data.”257 It questions whether re-report rates on the AR track
provide any meaningful measure of child safety:
Because this finding is based on administrative data rather than direct measures of safety . . . it must be interpreted carefully, because
the differential response process could plausibly result in less involvement of any agency with the children, who could then be less
likely to be rereported even though they were being reabused.258

Deborah Daro and Kenneth Dodge conducted a comprehensive
review of DR programs in a 2009 publication, finding “few positive
effects on the initiative’s four core outcomes—child safety, parental
capacity and access to support, child welfare agency and network
efficiency, and community responsibility for child protection . . . .”259

251. OLSON & STROUD, supra note 3, at 1-4.
252. Id. at 86.
253. Id. at 87.
254. IOM/NRC 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
255. Id. at 206.
256. Id. at 204.
257. Id. at 206.
258. Id. at 205.
259. Deborah Daro & Kenneth A. Dodge, Creating Community Responsibility for Child
Protection: Possibilities and Challenges, FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2009, at 84, available at
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/19_02-04.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/MXD4-TR6Y (discussing DR programs going by the name “community
partnership”).
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3. Hughes and Rycus Analysis of the Early Advocacy Research
The 2013 Hughes and Rycus article makes an enormous contribution to the DR debate.260 It was written from within the child welfare
research world by highly respected scholars who have held, and who
continue to hold, high-level positions with important organizations in
the area of child maltreatment research. Ronald Hughes and Judith
Rycus, the lead authors, serve as executive director and program
director, respectively, of the North American Resource Center for
Child Welfare, Institute for Human Services (IHS/NARCCW).261
Hughes also served as the president of APSAC and serves as its ongoing president emeritus.262
The IHS/NARCCW initiated in early 2010 a comprehensive research and literature review to address the organization’s developing
concerns with DR implementation and evaluation, including concerns
about child safety. This resulted in publication of the Hughes and
Rycus co-authored article in 2013, 263 which triggered immediate attention. The editor of Research on Social Work Practice devoted the
entire September 2013 issue to this article, related reaction papers,
and a response to those papers by Hughes and Rycus.264
The Hughes and Rycus analysis provides a devastating critique
that includes the following key elements. First, it questions the
methodology of the DR advocacy research on multiple grounds, including the fact that experimental AR and control TR samples were
not comparable and concludes:
To claim or imply that an intervention being evaluated is responsible for observed outcomes without fully considering the potential role of . . . other variables can provide a distorted and exaggerated picture of the state of our knowledge about an intervention’s effectiveness.
. . . . It is concerning that in most of the studies we reviewed,
the claims presented in the research reports frequently overreached what might have legitimately been concluded, considering
their many methodological limitations.265

260. See generally Hughes et al., supra note 6.
261. Staff, N. AM. RES. CTR. FOR CHILD WELFARE, http://www.ihs-trainet.com/
about/staff.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8YX4-3QPR.
262. Board of Directors, AM. PROF’L SOC’Y ON THE ABUSE OF CHILD.,
http://www.apsac.org/board-of-directors (last visited Feb. 12, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/6D8P-VWAA.
263. Hughes et al., supra note 6, at 495.
264. See generally id. (indicating that this article was the feature of the special issue on
Issues in DR).
265. Id. at 500.
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Second, they challenge the centrally important safety claim made
by DR advocates—that DR does not put children at risk. They find—
based on an extensive analysis of the nature of DR and of the research—both reason for concern about safety and inadequate evidence alleviating that concern.266 They point to the many reasons
why re-report rates and worker assessments of family safety provide
inadequate measures of comparative child safety on the two tracks,
summarizing: “[I]t is not possible to conclude that a DR model exists
that can ensure that children’s safety is not compromised in alternative tracks.”267
Third, the article condemns the research as promotion masked as
science:
[W]e found unsupported, inflated, and unfounded promotional
claims to be a significant problem in the differential response . . .
research we reviewed. . . . [M]any of the studies . . . failed to fully
articulate and explain study limitations and often failed to propose
alternative explanations for study findings, thus increasing the
likelihood that readers would draw erroneous conclusions not supported by the data. Many claims in this body of literature about
the benefits of DR exemplify marketing and promotional strategies
rather than objective science.
....
This type of promotion has no place in outcome research. The
scientific and ethical foundations of outcome research, its empirical and ethical legitimacy, and its practical utility are all undermined or discounted by promotional strategies other than the accurate, objective, and transparent demonstration of evidence. 268

Several leading experts and organizations within the child welfare
field provided important support for Hughes’s and Rycus’s conclusions. Viola Vaughan-Eden and Frank Vandervort, then president
and president-elect, respectively, of the APSAC,269 describe the
Hughes and Rycus article as perhaps “the most important article in
the child welfare arena in the past 15 years.”270 They question “how a
program with so little empirical support gained such favor . . . in this
266. Id. at 500-04.
267. Id. at 504.
268. Id. app.B, at 516.
269. APSAC is “the leading national organization supporting professionals who serve
children and families affected by child maltreatment and violence.” APSAC’s 22nd Annual
Colloquium, AM. PROF’L SOC’Y ON THE ABUSE OF CHILD. 18 (2014), available at
http://www.mipsac.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2014-Colloquium-Brochure.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/5Z2X-9DSU. Ms. Vaughan-Eden is also the current President of
the National Organization of Forensic Social Work. Biography, VIOLA VAUGHAN-EDEN,
http://www.violavaughaneden.com/sub_biography.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/NJF5-NV6Q.
270. Vaughan-Eden & Vandervort, supra note 39, at 550.
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era of evidence-based practice.”271 Their own explanation is the “unholy alliance” between left and right political forces,272 noting that
just such an alliance partnered to enact the first DR legislation in
Missouri in 1994.273 They also point to the role played by “politically
connected private foundations,” warning how that “can distort research designs, findings, and assertions about the efficacy of programming in the field of child welfare.” 274 Finally, they call for a
moratorium on the use of DR until it has been “rigorously and honestly studied,” warning that failure to do so will put children at undue risk.275
Christopher Baird co-authored an article on behalf of the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency and the Children’s Research Center, both important organizations in the child welfare and related
research fields.276 This article notes that Hughes and Rycus are “internationally known experts with extensive experience in policy and
program development, much of which was designed to improve practice through family engagement techniques[]. . . [and who] have also
championed the application of research findings and evidence-based
programs to inform program development.”277
They praise the Hughes and Rycus paper for its “compelling critique” and its courage in taking on such a popular program.278 They
join in questioning the DR research methodology, noting that with
AR track programs receiving extra resources not provided to the TR
track, “it would be surprising” if AR parents and staff did not find AR
more responsive to family needs.279 They support the concerns with
the accuracy of DR safety claims and warn of the need to be cautious
about “creating cultures of ‘naïve practice’ in which workers focus
solely on family strengths and protective capacities.”280

271. Id.
272. Id. (quoting BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 44); see discussion infra Part V.B.
273. Id. at 550-51.
274. Id. at 551.
275. Id. at 552-53.
276. Christopher Baird et al., Response to the Hughes et al. Paper on Differential Response, 23 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 535, 535 (2013).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 536.
280. Id. at 537-38.
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4. The QIC-DR Research281
The DR movement planned the QIC-DR stage as the culminating
research platform for mounting the final push for their hoped-for
federal finance reform. The QIC-DR reports were to serve as the ultimate demonstration of the success of DR, providing a basis for federal government action diverting funding from traditional CPS programs to DR.282 In 2008, the U.S. Children’s Bureau provided a fiveyear, multimillion-dollar grant in 2008283 to the AHA and its partners, including the IAR.284
Three state programs were chosen for study in Illinois, Colorado,
and Ohio. The final state research reports were published in late
2013 and early 2014, and the Final Cross-Site Report, designed to
compare and summarize the evidence from the three state program
studies, was published in July 2014.285
The reports reveal troubling evidence of the danger that DR poses
for children, which is discussed below.286 However, despite this evidence, the reports read like success stories yet again. Indeed, the claim
is now made that DR is ready not simply for dramatic expansion
across the nation for the low-risk cases for which it was supposedly
designed. The reports argue that the case has been made for expansion
to high-risk cases! This conclusion is, of course, consistent with the
Casey Family Programs goal of eliminating foster care altogether.
Thus the Ohio Final Report concludes, based on no comprehensible reasoning, that AR “may be effective among somewhat higherrisk cases.”287 The Colorado Final Report similarly argues for considering expansion of DR to high-risk cases without any apparent basis

281. Quality Improvement Center on Differential Response, UNIV. OF COLO. DENVER,
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/medicalschool/departments/pediatrics/subs/ca
n/QIC-DR/Pages/QIC-DR.aspx
(last
visited
Feb.
13,
2015),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/ZAY5-X8VD.
282. Morrison & Dzuba, supra note 201, at 18 n.12 (citing conversation with Brett Brown,
former cross-site evaluator for the three-state DR evaluation worked during the summer of
2013 for Commissioner Samuels in the Administration of Children and Families).
283. The U.S. Children’s Bureau was credited for funding in the acknowledgments of
the QIC-DR Final Cross-Site Report. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at i.
284. Id. at 5, 10.
285. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at ii.
286. See supra Parts IV.B.4.a.i and IV.B.4.a.ii.
287. JULIE MURPHY ET AL., HUMAN SERVS. RESEARCH INST., OHIO SOAR PROJECT:
FINAL
REPORT
133
(2013),
available
at
http://www.hsri.org/files/uploads/
publications/OHIO_SOAR_Final_Report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E2DE-7FS8. The
Report relies simply on the slightly lower foster care placement rate for AR and admits
that “this evaluation has not truly tested the effectiveness of AR with higher-risk populations.” Id. at 133.
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in evidence.288 This is especially interesting in light of the fact that
DR in Colorado was triggered by a series of high-profile child fatalities in 2007.289 Such fatalities might be thought indicative of the need
for more intensive intervention by CPS to monitor and consider removal of children; however, they were used instead to justify the institution of DR for low-risk cases, which is now alleged to be appropriate for high-risk cases.
The Final QIC-DR Cross-Site Report makes clear the general absence of evidence in the three QIC-DR state studies that AR works
particularly well in any respect, even in terms of pleasing parents.290
Nonetheless, the Report ends by making claims that the studies have
implications for widespread changes in traditional systems in the DR
direction. Thus, the report raises questions as to whether “jurisdictions wish to consider that all families who are referred to CPS would
be eligible for AR[,]”291 whether higher-risk cases should be included
in AR, and whether CPS workers should have the discretion to reassign TR families to AR.292 It makes the connection with federal finance reform, noting that reducing foster care placements and using
Title IV-E waivers may be the way to fund DR.293 And finally, the
Report indicates that DR may lead the way to fundamental change of
the entire CPS system, so that CPS itself becomes an agency largely
devoted to linking even high-risk families on a voluntary basis to
services, rather than identifying perpetrators who can be required to
engage in rehabilitation programs and whose parental rights can be
restricted.294
This movement to expand DR to virtually all CPS cases, including
high-risk cases, is inconsistent with the reasoning on which DR was
originally premised. And even some of DR’s most important supporters, Tony Loman and Gary Siegel, stated in a recent article that AR is
inappropriate for high-risk cases, arguing based on their research that
it should be targeted toward families without prior maltreatment reports rather than toward chronic offenders or parents with “deeper
and more intractable problems, such as mental illness, substance
abuse, domestic violence or children that are difficult to care for, which
often characterize families frequently encountered by CPS.”295
288. WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 124 (“[T]he question must also be asked about
whether the Colorado DR model could benefit high-risk families as well.”); see also id. at
124-25 (stating the Report’s final conclusions).
289. Id. at ix.
290. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 68-129.
291. Id. at 122.
292. Id. at 124.
293. Id. at 125.
294. Id. at 127-28.
295. Loman & Siegel, supra note 135, at 1666.
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(a) New Evidence of Safety Risks in Differential Response
The QIC-DR research provides powerful evidence of the risks that
DR poses to children, however minimized those risks are by the authors. This evidence appears in connection with the Illinois DR program, which is interesting because Illinois diverted an unusually low
percentage of cases to the AR track,296 presumably a much lower-risk
group overall than the groups that are more typically diverted to AR.
i. High Re-Report Rates on the Voluntary Track
DR advocates have made the claim from the beginning that DR
poses no additional risks to children, citing as primary evidence that
re-report rates for families on the AR track were the same as, or lower than, rates for families on the TR track. But the Illinois QIC-DR
research finds higher re-report rates for the AR track.297 Moreover, the
difference in re-report risk increased over time,298 making it likely
that the difference would be even greater a year or two out.
This is dramatic new news. One investigative journalist sums up
the significance as follows:
The long delayed release of an evaluation of Illinois’ differential response program casts new doubts on whether one of the country’s
most popular child welfare reforms is safe for children and a smart
way to spend limited resources dedicated to families on the fringe.
According to the report, children whose parents had benefitted
from twice as much social work time, $400 stipends and a philosophy that stresses family strengths were more likely to be reported
for child maltreatment and become victims of substantiated abuse
or neglect.
This controverts 20 years of evaluations and assurances that children involved with . . . [DR] programs across the country were as
safe or safer than children who received traditional child protective services.299

In addition, all three state that the QIC-DR studies found very
high maltreatment re-report rates on both the AR and TR tracks, a
fact that prior DR research revealed only in passing, if at all. The
Ohio Final QIC-DR research reveals re-report rates of 37% for AR
families and 36% for TR families.300 The Colorado Final QIC-DR re296. See MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 28-29.
297. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 65 (providing that
18.8% of the AR families experienced re-reports, as compared to 14.7% of the TR families,
within 18 months of case closure).
298. Id. at 65-66.
299. Heimpel, supra note 7.
300. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 113.
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search reveals re-report rates of 44% for AR families and 45% for TR
families within a short year of the initial referral to CPS.301
ii. High Drop-Out Rates and Related Safety Risks on the
Voluntary Track
The Illinois Final QIC-DR research finally provides evidence
about the AR dropout population.302 The revelation of this information seems motivated by the authors’ need to explain away the
disturbing finding that AR re-report rates are higher than TR
rates.303 One has to ask whether, had the authors of the earlier advocacy research been willing to provide the dropout breakdown statistics, we would have seen similarly disturbing evidence. In any event,
the Illinois dropout statistics provide stunning new evidence of the
risks inherent in DR.
First, of those originally allocated to the AR track, almost one in
three drop out. Less than half of those originally diverted to AR complete the program. (The additional one-sixth is transferred to DR,
because their cases are re-assessed as high risk.) Those withdrawing
after first starting down the AR track have the highest re-report rates
of all. Those on the TR track have the lowest re-report rates of all. For
substantiated re-reports, the findings are similar, with AR withdrawers having the highest re-report rates and the TR rates coming in close
to the bottom of the various AR and TR groups.304
These data on dropout re-report rates—the first provided over
many years of this advocacy research—are stunningly negative for DR
proponents. The fact that those who participate and then drop off the
AR track have the highest re-report rates of all groups raises powerful
questions about the success of DR programs in assessing risk for purposes of assigning children to AR, the success of AR services in addressing maltreatment problems, and the risks for children of being
on the AR track.
The fact that the overall dropout rate is close to one-third, counting those refusing services from the outset, is similarly troubling. DR
is justified in large part as a way of providing services that allegedly
are not being provided on the traditional CPS track. In Illinois, DR
was supposed to respond in part to the fact that the state was not
meeting federal requirements for providing services to children identified as victims of child maltreatment.305 But now we know that the

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 59.
FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 68-69.
See id. at 66.
For the data in this paragraph, see id. at 68-69.
Id. at 14-15.
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AR track also fails to provide services to a substantial proportion of
all of its families.
The fact that less than half of the original AR track families end
up completing AR services also calls into question all aspects of the
DR research over the years based on parent and worker surveys,
since these surveys are based on only a small sample of those who
complete AR services.306
A final, supremely interesting fact revealed by the breakdown is
that parents refusing AR services from the get-go have next to the lowest re-report rates and the lowest substantiated re-report rates.307 This
puzzling fact is left totally unexplored by the Illinois Report. Interestingly, the authors make no claim that this represents the actual maltreatment rate for this population. Indeed, it would be problematic
for DR proponents to assert that the families who do best of all are
those left totally free from the supposed benefits of AR services.
But it is important to ask why these re-report rates for the early
dropouts are so low, now that we finally have this breakdown. It
seems likely that this low re-report rate is simply not an accurate
reflection of the actual repeat maltreatment rate—that maltreatment
that occurs among families who refuse ever to participate in AR is
not being captured by official reports in the same way it is captured
for other AR and TR families. As discussed above, this group is free
from the kind of surveillance characterizing participants on both AR
and TR tracks, surveillance that is more likely to trigger reports.308
If the low re-report rate for early dropouts has no real relationship to actual maltreatment rates, then all of the DR claims regarding child safety based on re-report rates made over the years are
questionable.
(b) Continuation of the Advocacy Research Mode
The QIC-DR research program promised to “rigorously study implementation, outcomes, and cost impact of DR.”309 Given the powerful attack by Hughes and Rycus on the earlier advocacy research and
the explosive debate reflected in the Research on Social Work Practice special issue, one might have hoped that those in charge of the
QIC-DR program would have consulted broadly to come up with a
new research team, a new set of research questions, and a new re306. Only a small percentage of those completing services and receiving survey questions actually respond to the surveys. See, e.g., WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 15 (noting a 21% response rate); discussion supra Part IV.B.1.c.
307. For the data, see FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 66-67
fig.29, 71 fig.31.
308. See supra Part IV.B.1.d.
309. BROWN ET AL., supra note 67, at 5.
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search design. Instead, the research leadership team involves the
same people and organizations central in the early advocacy research
and, not surprisingly, has largely replicated that research approach.
Only one of the three Final Reports even refers to the Hughes and
Rycus article.310 The Final Cross-Site Report makes no mention of it.
This QIC-DR leadership team is responsible both for promoting
and developing the DR model across the United States and for the
research that is supposed to assess the value of that model.311 This
represents the same troublesome merger of advocacy and research
roles that has plagued DR from the beginning.
Loman and Siegel, along with the IAR, are credited in the QIC-DR
reports as consultants and for contributing their research design.312
While they did not actually author the reports, their influence in the
design and implementation of the research is apparent. The QIC-DR
reports largely track the topics and organization of the earlier IAR
reports and reflect a similar methodology. Casey Family Foundation
staff members are acknowledged as advisors.313
Most of the troubling features of the earlier research are replicated.
So, for example, new funding is provided for services on the AR, but
not the TR, track;314 and AR staff are specially selected and trained.315
Comparisons are then made between AR and TR tracks, and claims
310. WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 1-2, nn.7-8. The only significant concession to
the critique of the earlier advocacy research is the decision to pursue an intent to treat
methodology, including in the AR sample for analysis the cases switched from the AR to
the TR track. The IAR removal of these switched cases from the AR analysis had been
criticized by Hughes and Rycus in their response article in the Social Work Practice special
issue. Ronald C. Hughes & Judith S. Rycus, Discussion of Issues in Differential Response,
23 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 563, 574 (2013).
311. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 5, 10.
312. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at ii (providing that Loman, Siegel, and the IAR contributed “countless hours of consultation and wisdom . . . and . . . detailed comments on earlier versions of this report”); WINOKUR ET AL.,
supra note 56, at iii (listing Loman and Siegel on the acknowledgements page and thanking them for research design that informed the Colorado evaluation); see also MURPHY ET
AL., supra note 287, at Acknowledgements (thanking the QIC cross-site team at the Kempe Center and Walter R. McDonald and Associates). The Final QIC-DR Cross-Site Report
says IAR “served in an advisory capacity throughout the project, especially around the
evaluation and instrument design[]” and notes that the evaluation instruments developed
by Loman and Siegel were most commonly used. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at
10, 50.
313. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at i (listing them as members of the QICDR’s National Advisory Committee on the acknowledgements page).
314. See, e.g., BROWN ET AL., supra note 67, at 23 (noting that all three sites have dedicated funds for AR cases available for “quick and concrete support services . . . . [and that]
IR workers in both Ohio and Illinois expressed some frustration with the unequal access to
funds for the families they serve”); see also MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 83 (discussing funds from QIC-DR grant and Casey Family Programs).
315. BROWN ET AL., supra note 67, at 25-30; see MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 3954, 132.
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for AR success are made, with limited acknowledgement that any
such success might be due simply to the differences in funding and
staffing. Indeed, in Illinois, an increased caseload size for the TR
workers based on the DR program was reported.316 And in all three
states, workers reported workload inequities,317 with TR track workers in Illinois saying that they were limited in their ability to provide
services by high caseloads and time limitations.318
There is the same troubling difference in types of services provided,
with a greater emphasis on the AR track on financial support and a
greater emphasis on the TR track on rehabilitative treatment.319 In
the Illinois system, for example, cash assistance of up to $400 was
available to AR parents,320 in addition to other supportive services
including: “car repair or transportation; housing assistance; food or
clothing; appliances, furniture, or home repairs; help paying utilities;
welfare/public assistance services; medical or dental care; other financial help; . . . cooking [and] cleaning . . . .” 321 The Illinois Report
characterizes AR services as “especially poverty-related.”322 TR services were more likely to include counseling, domestic violence services, parenting skills and related training, substance abuse treatment, and help getting mental health services.323 As with earlier DR
advocacy research, there is no adequate discussion of how these differences in services make comparisons between success on the different tracks questionable and no discussion at all of whether shifting
the emphasis so significantly from rehabilitative to financial support
services is helpful in protecting children.
There is the same use of cost savings as supposed evidence of success when it is, of course, predictable that eliminating investigations
and reducing the use of foster care would reduce costs. 324 There is the
316. BROWN ET AL., supra note 67, at 30. The Illinois Report is guilty of an outrageous
additional apples and oranges comparison that proves nothing regarding the alleged differences in the level of services provided on the two tracks. The Report first claims that the
AR track provides more services than the TR track, only to later admit that the comparison
is based on a period of time when the AR workers are supposed to be providing services but
when the TR workers are supposed to be simply investigating, with the TR system designed to provide services at a later stage of the TR process. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR
IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 61, 82 n.30.
317. BROWN ET AL., supra note 67, at 35.
318. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 59.
319. See MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 7, 85 tbl.7.2, 119.
320. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
321. Id. at 4, 53; see also MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 85 tbl.4.7, n.52 (providing a
similar list of AR services).
322. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
323. Id. at 53-56 tbl.5, figs. 20 & 21; MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 7;
MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 83 tbl.4.6; WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 79.
324. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 85 (noting cost savings
due to investigations and child removals on TR track); MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note
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same failure to seriously engage with whether such financial savings
come at the cost of increased maltreatment of children.
There is the same advocacy tone. For example, the Ohio QIC-DR
Final Report’s introductory chapter ends with this statement of what
is to come: “[W]e describe in more detail how AR is perceived as effective in terms of implementation, practice, and outcomes.”325
There is the same glossing over of problematic issues indicating
risks for children and the same rosy “read” of the evidence to produce
an enthusiastic success story. As discussed above,326 the Illinois QICDR Report reveals disturbing new evidence that DR poses risks to
children, showing that parents on the AR track have higher re-report
rates than TR track children, that AR track parents drop out at extremely high rates, and that AR parents who drop out have the highest re-report rates of all groups assessed. However, the Illinois Report’s concluding chapter portrays DR as a shining success:
One of the most consistent findings to emerge from the Illinois
DR evaluation is that parents who received DR felt more strongly
positive about all aspects of their child protective services experience when compared to parents who received an investigation. . . . [A] significantly greater percentage of parents who received DR had more positive emotional responses and fewer negative ones, were more highly engaged, and were more highly satisfied with their worker and the services they received.327

It sums up safety issues, stating that “[t]he totality of all available
evidence from . . . [the] six rigorous [randomized controlled trial studies to date] seems to indicate that children who receive DR are at
least as safe as those who receive an investigation.”328 This statement
conveniently avoids reference to the Illinois Report’s own devastating
conclusions regarding child safety in the Illinois DR program.329 In an
interview, the lead researcher for this Illinois study confessed that
while their research found that “ ‘families like it better . . . [and that
2, at 8, 106; MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 125 (containing a small sample that indicated limited cost savings with the DR program, which was primarily attributable to foster
care reduction).
325. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 12.
326. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.a.
327. FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 91.
328. Id. at 92.
329. See supra Part IV.B.4.a. See also WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 71-75, 110
(massaging the Colorado QIC-DR report evidence to find positive safety implications). The
Report claims that the “lack of a statistically significant finding for the short-term safety
outcomes was not surprising given that the DR system reform also enhanced traditional
CPS practices” with scant evidence of the latter. WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at 110. It
claims that “[t]he most promising finding was that there may be long-term child safety
benefits and cost savings due to lower levels of re-involvement, over time” for AR families.
This is based solely on the iffy “survival analysis” which purports to predict, in the absence of
referrals actually observed during the study period, what future referrals will take place. Id.
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i]n that sense it works fine. If you look at safety you may have a different answer.’ ”330 Nonetheless, she concluded that DR was “a promising practice.”331
The Final Cross-Site QIC-DR Report notes that Illinois broke
down the groups on the AR track for the first time, but then fails to
provide any information whatsoever about the troubling evidence of
safety issues that the breakdown revealed, including the evidence
that AR dropouts had the highest re-report rates of all groups.332 Instead, the Cross-Site Report simply refers the reader to an appendix
that was unpublished and thus unavailable on the website at the
time of the Report’s online publication!333
There is the same troubling emphasis on parent satisfaction and
parent perceptions of their own engagement as measures of success.334 But prior research problems are now topped by the use of parent views to make safety claims. Thus, parent perceptions of child
safety and family well-being are used as key indicators of the allimportant child safety findings.335 All of the problems discussed
above336 plague this attempt to use parent views as proving anything
other than the completely unsurprising conclusion that the relative
handful of parents who choose to fill out the survey, among the already limited group sticking with the voluntary program to the end,
are prepared to say they think it has helped them, and that they report feeling more positive about the program than parents on the TR
track who, of course, may not like the fact that they are subject to
investigations, monitoring, and the threat of further intervention
based on repeated child maltreatment. Using these parent perceptions as evidence of child safety seems an obviously desperate move,
triggered perhaps by the absence of other helpful evidence.
In addition, removal to foster care is now used as an important
supposed measure of child safety.337 The fact that somewhat greater
330. Heimpel, supra note 7 (quoting Tamara Fuller, Director of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s Center on Child Welfare Research).
331. Id. (quoting Tamara Fuller, Director of the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign’s Center on Child Welfare Research).
332. See supra Part IV.B.4.a.ii.
333. MERKEL-HOLGUIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 53-54, 123-24.
334. See, e.g., MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 132 (“[W]hile AR did not result in
higher levels of family satisfaction, AR families did report being more likely to contact their
worker in the future, being better off and better parents because of their experience with
the agency, and report higher levels of engagement in the case work process.”).
335. See, e.g., FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at v (Table of
Contents chapter 6, “Child Safety and Family Well-Being,” listing the following after “6.5
Child Removals:” “6.6 Parent Perceptions of Child Safety” and “6.7 Parent Perceptions of
Family Well-Being”); WINOKUR ET AL., supra note 56, at vi, 76 (using parent perceptions to
measure child safety and family well-being).
336. Supra Parts IV.B.1.b, IV.B.1.c.
337. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 115-16.
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use has been made of foster care to date on the TR track, with more
also predicted for the future, is used to claim that children are less at
risk on the AR track, with no discussion as to why this measure should
count as a proxy for child safety. Given that the whole point of AR is to
reduce the use of more intensive and intrusive methods of child protection, the reduced use of foster care is no surprise. Obviously, one could
predict a reduction in such use. The big question that DR poses,
though, is whether such reduction helps or hurts children. There are
many reasons to think that foster care removal generally serves to
protect children.338 This is part of why questions have been raised from
the beginning as to whether DR puts children at undue risk. These DR
reports simply ignore all of the obvious problems with using this as a
measure of success and claim, case proven!339
V. THE UNDERLYING POLITICS: WHY THE RESISTANCE TO CHILDFRIENDLY CHILD WELFARE POLICIES?
Why this DR Movement? Why has it gained such traction given all
of the obvious risks to children and flaws in the research? Why this
succession of extreme family preservation movements with similar
characteristics? Understanding all of this is key to making the future
of child welfare different.
The real reasons for these policies must be different from the reasons given. Those given are too obviously questionable, and the research cited in support of these policies is too obviously flawed. So,
for example, with IFPS, it is hard to believe that those promoting
these policies really thought child abuse was typically just a six-week
crisis that could be solved with social worker support and house
cleaning. With Racial Disproportionality, it is hard to believe that
those promoting the racial bias theory really thought blacks could
just overcome through their unique family strengths the poverty and
related conditions that predicted child maltreatment for other
groups. And now with DR, it is hard to believe that the proponents
really think parents who suffer from substance abuse, mental illness,
and other serious dysfunction characterizing those responsible for
child maltreatment will magically become nurturing parents simply
because parent-friendly social workers hand them rent payments.
338. See discussion supra Part III.A.
339. When asked about this problem in the research, Tony Loman said that no research studies were contemplated assessing whether the children kept at home pursuant to
DR were, in fact, better or worse off than the children removed to foster care. Telephone
Interview with Tony Loman, supra note 139. The 2013 QIC-DR Ohio Report does concede
that higher removal rates might relate to a greater concern by TR investigators with child
safety, but it argues that the DR research suggests that vigilance regarding safety is not
relaxed under AR. They concede that the reasons for the differences in removal rates might
be examined in research. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 287, at 48-49.
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Some would say that family preservation simply reflects deeply
held values about family privacy in our society.340 We value individual autonomy in ways that few other nations do, and this is reflected
in constitutional and other policies protecting the family against
state intervention.341
But family privacy is not always sacrosanct. Women’s rights advocates fought the idea of family privacy when they saw women victimized by domestic violence and felt the need for protective intervention
by the state.342 They fought the idea that relationships in which
women were victimized were the kinds of families that deserved
preservation.343 And they have achieved dramatic changes in policy
over recent decades, expanding state intervention with the goal of
liberating women from families that do not function the way families
should.
Why have children not been seen as entitled to similar liberation?
A. Children Have No Rights
Unlike women, children have no rights. This is true in the literal
sense that they—especially the most vulnerable among them—
cannot speak for themselves, demonstrate on the streets, vote, get
themselves elected to office or appointed as judges, and do the other
things that adults do both in expressing their rights and in pushing
for the establishment of additional rights.
As a formal legal matter, children have no rights to nurturing
parents under federal or state constitutional law. By contrast, parents have powerful constitutional rights to hold onto and raise their
children free from undue state intervention. This constitutional
framework both reflects our societal values and helps to shape our
entire CPS system.344 It makes extreme family preservation policies
seem right and just.
The rest of the world thinks of children as having rights, at least
as a formal matter. Virtually all other countries have ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which accords children
equal status with adults as rights holders. Under the CRC, children
340. Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child
Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1741-42 (2000) (reviewing BARTHOLET, supra note 1).
341. Id.
342. BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 50-54.
343. Id.
344. For powerful challenges to this understanding of the traditional constitutional
framing of child and parent rights, see James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The
State, Parentage, and the Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755 (2009) [hereinafter Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright]; James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense:
States’ Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407
(2008) [hereinafter Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense].
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have rights to nurturing parents and rights to be protected against
abuse and neglect. Under the CRC, nations have duties to protect
children against maltreatment and to ensure that children receive
appropriate nurturing.345 These aspects of the CRC are part of the
explanation for why the United States has not ratified the CRC.346
B. The Left-Right Bargain:
A Cheap Version of the War on Poverty347
Many of those advocating for extreme family preservation policies
appear to be using children to promote an anti-poverty agenda. The
children at risk for abuse and neglect are disproportionately the children of the poor. Left-wing forces committed to helping poor people
and historically oppressed racial minority groups often see efforts to
intervene in families to protect children as yet another attack upon
already victimized groups. They often see family preservation services as providing at least some financial and other support for poor
families in a society reluctant to provide enough support.
Family preservation programs do, as a general matter, provide
financial stipends and related forms of support for a subset of poor
families. If children identified as at risk for abuse and neglect are
kept at home, or returned home from foster care, the parents often
receive supportive services. IFPS programs offered housekeeping,
childcare, transportation and other services, and many other family
preservation programs offer similar assistance. DR programs pride
themselves on providing financial support.
Right-wing forces often see family preservation policies as a way
to reduce government and save money. Those promoting family
preservation provide evidence and arguments to support the costsaving goal. And short term, these policies often do save money.
Eliminating CPS jurisdiction over families eliminates the costs of
social worker monitoring. Reducing foster care eliminates the cost of
foster parent stipends as well as CPS administration. Most family
preservation policies, including both IFPS and DR, have been sold in
significant part on the basis of such cost-savings arguments.
But there are problems with this left-right bargain that should
trouble people on both sides of the political spectrum. For the left,
this is a pathetically limited anti-poverty strategy. Providing poor
people and oppressed racial minority groups the limited financial
345. Elizabeth Bartholet, Ratification by the United States of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child: Pros and Cons from a Child’s Rights Perspective, 633 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 80, 85-86, 91-94 (2011).
346. Id. at 87-88, 91-94.
347. For discussion of the left-right politics of child welfare, see BARTHOLET, supra note
1, at 44-55, and also see GELLES, supra note 37, at 132-33.
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subsidies available in these family preservation programs is no road
to empowerment.
Moreover, if the best we can do today are limited poverty alleviation efforts, it is wrong to choose one that comes at the expense of the
most powerless subset of the poor—the children victimized by abuse
and neglect. And it may ultimately be counter-productive: children so
victimized are disproportionately likely to grow up impoverished
themselves, and in the ranks of the homeless, the unemployed, and
those addicted to drugs and alcohol.348 They are also disproportionately likely to victimize their own children, thus continuing the vicious cycle into future generations.349
It is also perverse to select that small subset of the poor who
abuse and neglect their children as the beneficiaries of this limited
anti-poverty campaign. Most poor people do their flat-out best to
raise their children well, providing loving and nurturing care despite
the oppressive conditions of their lives. Why should they be denied
the financial benefits that abusive parents get in the form of family
preservation services?
For the right, extreme family preservation policies may look
cheap, but in the long run, they are very expensive. Children who are
denied appropriate nurturing and who end up in disproportionate
numbers on welfare, in prisons, and suffering emotional and physical
disabilities are children who are very expensive in the long run.350
C. Private Wealth Dominance over Policy
Advocacy and Research
For the past several decades, a small group of enormously wealthy
and powerful organizations have dominated both policy and research
in child welfare. From the 1980s through the 1990s, it was the Edna
McConnell Foundation and the Annie E. Casey Foundation leading
the charge on IFPS.351 More recently, it has been a combination of the
Casey Foundations, primarily the Annie E. Casey and the Casey
Family Programs Foundation, leading the charge on Racial Disproportionality and DR.352
Research is desperately needed to guide policy. This is always
true, given the difficulty of knowing how different policy ideas will
play out in the real world. It is particularly true in child welfare giv-

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 95-97.
BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 96.
See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 55; Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1350 n.75.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Introduction and Part I.B.
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en the danger that policies purporting to serve child interests will
actually be motivated by various adult interests.
It is extremely dangerous to have one set of wealthy, private players dominating both policy advocacy and research to the degree that
they have.353
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM
A. Children’s Rights
We need a radical upending of the rights hierarchy in this country, so that children are valued equally with adults and their most
fundamental rights to grow up with nurturing parents are valued
equally with adult rights to raise their children.354
Ratification by the United States of the CRC, or some other dramatic move to grant children equal status with adults as rights holders, would be a meaningful step forward in changing the dynamics of
child welfare.355
But it would not by itself solve the problem. Even with formal
rights, the fact that children are inherently powerless as compared to
adults will make a huge difference. Adults like to think that they love
and appreciate children, but there is always a risk that those with
more power will exploit and oppress those with less. And there is always a risk that adults claiming to represent children will be using
children to promote various adult agendas. We need to acknowledge
the challenge of granting children truly equal recognition in law and
policy and begin to design new ways of holding accountable the adults
who in the end will still make so many decisions about children.
B. Maltreatment Prevention: Radical Social Reform,
Early Supportive Intervention, and CPS Reform
The DR proponents are right to say that maltreatment is rooted in
poverty and social injustice. They are right to say that we should
focus more on early prevention of maltreatment. But they propose a
solution that utterly fails to meet the mark. Providing rent stipends
and other financial benefits to the tiny subset of the poor who maltreat their children is no empowerment strategy, nor will it do much
to prevent maltreatment.

353. See Bartholet, supra note 23, at 880-90.
354. See generally Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright, supra note 344 (arguing that a
child’s constitutional rights should be a paramount consideration when deciding the child’s
parentage); Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense, supra note 344 (arguing that children
should be protected from birth from unfit parents).
355. See Bartholet, supra note 345, at 84-94, 99.
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We need a true war on poverty of the kind that President Lyndon
Johnson announced356 but that no president since has renewed. We
need serious programs to address poverty and the conditions associated with poverty, including unemployment, substance abuse, mental
illness, and blighted neighborhoods.
Critics of the earlier family preservation movements that preceded
this DR movement noted that they also constituted cheap and, in the
end, utterly inadequate attempts to address the issues of poverty and
injustice underlying child maltreatment. They noted that we needed
a far more radical engagement with these issues, a true war on poverty. One of the authors of a landmark critique of IFPS, concluded in
a later article that IFPS was doomed to failure because the problems
producing child maltreatment were “rooted in poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing, substance abuse, and severe and persistent mental illness.”357 My 2009 article on the Racial Disproportionality movement argued that it was similarly misdirected, proposing a
false solution that avoided the real problems and the need for truly
radical social reform.358
While such reform is sadly not on the immediate horizon, there
are programs that could make a major difference that would not require radical social changes or overwhelming financial commitments.
We should embrace these. So, for example, we should expand the
programs that target parents at risk for maltreatment early on, before they fall into the kind of dysfunction that breeds maltreatment.
This is the stage at which we have evidence that prevention efforts
have the best chance of working. There are at least a number of early
home visitation programs with powerful evidence of success in reducing maltreatment and reducing important predictors for maltreatment.359 We need to devote massively increased resources to these
programs and to the development of other promising programs similarly targeted to early prevention.
We also need to do some version of DR but within the framework
of the traditional CPS system. For this, we need new resources devoted to CPS, since a large part of the reason that it provides so little
in the way of services to the families on its caseload has to do with
the inadequacy of resources. Additional resources are also needed to
356. President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964).
357. Julia H. Littell, Effects of the Duration, Intensity, and Breadth of Family Preservation Services: A New Analysis of Data from the Illinois Family First Experiment, 19
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 17, 36 (1997).
358. Bartholet, supra note 23, at 923; see also Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1341-42 n.
58 (quoting the papers summing up the evidence produced at the conference on Racial
Disproportionality co-sponsored by Harvard Law School’s Child Advocacy Program and
Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago).
359. See BARTHOLET, supra note 1, at 165-68; Bartholet, supra note 26, at 1346-50.
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enable CPS to protect the children at highest risk through monitoring, mandated rehabilitative programs for parents, removal to foster
care, and adoption.
Resources will be hard to come by. Part of the allure of all family
preservation proposals is that they promise to save money. But we
cannot protect children adequately on the cheap. And we are not really
saving state funds by allowing children to be abused and neglected.
Many studies demonstrate the overwhelming long-term costs involved
when children grow up in the absence of appropriate nurturing.360
C. Research Reform
Major challenges have been raised regarding the quality and persuasiveness of the research touting DR as a success story. An increasing number of critics have given voice to their concerns both
about the nature of the advocacy research and the substance of DR
programs.361 This gives hope for better research in the future, providing a better guide to policymakers as to whether DR is the right direction for child welfare reform or, instead, just the wrong direction.
It gives hope for research making child welfare the primary focus and
research, honestly assessing the risks of DR, and also comparing DR
not simply to the current, inadequate CPS system, but also to a
strengthened CPS system with enhanced power to protect children.
But even if this hope is realized and even if the DR movement is
brought to a halt, fundamental change in the dynamics of child welfare research is needed if history is not endlessly to repeat itself. We
have now had many decades in which different forms of extreme family preservation have been promoted, supported by research designed
simply to vindicate the ideological view of those promoting the policy
programs. While there is some excellent independent research in the
child welfare field, there is not nearly enough, and often it takes
years for this research to surface, years during which advocacy programs are propagated based on false claims of success.
The child welfare field needs a new tradition of truly independent,
neutral research, free from any advocacy agenda and committed to
finding the objective truth. We need new sources for research funding
that have no commitment to predetermined policy directions. We
need social scientists to be able to pursue the truth and to ask questions and come to conclusions that challenge orthodox thinking, free
from fear of retribution, including limits on future research opportunities. We need research that will place a new focus on child interests

360. See discussion supra Part V.B.; see also supra text accompanying note 350.
361. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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and that can provide a meaningful guide to policymakers interested
in doing the right thing for children.
Without this kind of fundamental change in the field’s research
dynamics, we can predict that even if the DR reform movement is
derailed, another similar movement will take its place and will enjoy
years of success based largely on the same kind of self-serving research that has historically played such a harmful role.
CONCLUSION
DR represents a dangerous direction for children. But it is a familiar, dangerous direction. The dynamics that have produced this latest
fad are the same dynamics that brought us the IFPS and Racial Disproportionality movements.
There is some indication now that this latest fad may be fading.
One recent report lists nine states as having decided to eliminate or
not expand their DR programs.362
Florida, one of the first states to adopt DR, dropped it after some
five years of experience.363 Illinois recently dropped its DR program
close to the end of the QIC-DR research study.364 The Illinois CPS
Department justified this decision to the legislature based on concerns that DR had caused safety problems by diverting staff from the
traditional CPS system, and it noted that the soon-to-be-released
QIC-DR Report found children on the AR track more likely to experience maltreatment recurrence than children on the TR track.365 Michigan concluded that DR research provided insufficient support for the
program and thus decided in 2013, and again in 2014, not to implement DR.366 In Los Angeles, a report by the County Counsel’s Chil362. Piper, supra note 55, at 100. The Casey Family Programs Implementation Kit lists
six states as having discontinued, with four of these in the planning stages of reinstating.
GUTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 6. The 2014 IOM Report mentions Arizona, Arkansas,
and West Virginia as among those dropping their DR programs. IOM/NRC 2014 REPORT,
supra note 2, at 199.
363. FLA. COMM. ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, & ELDER AFFAIRS, DIFFERENTIAL
RESPONSE TO REPORTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, S. 2011-105, at 3-4 (2010), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/UserContent/Session/2011/Publications/InterimReports/
pdf/2011-105cf.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D49U-DTQM (discussing 1998 legislation
eliminating DR).
364. See FULLER ET AL., FINAL QIC-DR IL REPORT, supra note 2, at 93.
365. Letter from Denise Gonzales, Acting Director, Ill. Dep’t. of Children & Family
Servs., to Sens. Mattie Hunter and Julie Morrison (Dec. 18, 2013) (on file with author).
366. Frank Vandervort, With Differential Response, History Repeats Itself and Children
Are Placed at Unnecessary Risk, CHRONICLE OF SOC. CHANGE (July 8, 2014),
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/opinion/with-differential-response-history-repeats-itselfand-children-are-placed-at-unnecessary-risk/7422, archived at http://perma.cc/4LK5VKKW (noting as a veteran of family preservation systems in Michigan the similarity
between that and DR, applauding Michigan’s decision to reject DR after reviewing 15
research studies, but predicting that the powerful DR forces “[will] be back again” (emphasis added)); e-mail from Frank Vandervort, Clinical Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law
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dren’s Special Investigative Unit in 2012, triggered by a rash of child
deaths, found that “under-informed investigations and an overreliance on L.A.’s differential response experiment . . . contributed to
the majority of the deaths.”367 Los Angeles eliminated its DR program
in 2012 based on these and related concerns that the program’s diversion of funds and staff from the traditional CPS system put children at undue risk.368 Minnesota, one of the early DR states, recently
formed a taskforce to assess the dangers to children posed by the
state’s child welfare system, including its emphasis on DR and the
related assignment of a large percentage of reported cases to the AR
track.369
DR may be increasingly discredited and even derailed in the coming years. But we can expect DR to be followed by another similar
movement. Radical change in the dynamics of the child welfare field
and in our thinking about children’s rights is a prerequisite for any
true reform.

Sch., to Ronald Hughes, Executive Director, North American Resource Center for Child
Welfare, Institute for Human Services, Judy Rycus Program Director, North American
Resource Center for Child Welfare, Institute for Human Services, and author (May 26,
2014, 2:25 PM) (on file with author) (forwarding information about Michigan’s DR program); see also Memorandum from Stacie Bladen, Mich. Dep’t of Human Servs., to Steve
Yager, Deputy Director, Mich. Dep’t of Human Servs., Children’s Servs. Administration
(Mar. 31, 2014) (on file with author) (recommending against DR implementation in Michigan based on the priority that Michigan places on child safety, review of the research, and
concern that DR’s absence of investigation puts children at risk).
367. Heimpel, supra note 7.
368. Id.
369. See, e.g., Brandon Stahl, Task Force Assails Child Protection for Meager Follow-up,
STAR TRIBUNE (Oct. 14, 2014, 6:17 AM), www.startribune.com/printarticle/?id=279047731,
archived at http://perma.cc/TK6N-UUZT.
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